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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the performance and investor behavior of Norwegian equity mutual 
funds in the time periods 1990-2012 and 2006-2012, respectively. The behavioral part try to 
reveal differences between local (Norwegian) and foreign (non-Norwegian) investors in light 
of home bias. We find that 94 per cent of the mutual funds are not expected to generate a 
significant positive alpha, excluding transaction costs. After deducting returns from capital 
assets, illustrations find that foreigners have more volatile cash flows than locals. We test if 
these differences are due to irrational biases, different risk profiles or information advantages. 
We provide significant evidence that three month average historic returns can predict larger 
changes in foreign capital assets than in local, which indicates that foreigners chase 
performance more than locals. Furthermore, we find that changes in foreign capital assets 
predict three- and six month average return better than locals, hence we can exclude the 
irrational bias story. Finally, after controlling for risk, we find significant positive alpha for 
foreigners and no significant results for locals, which exclude the different risk profile story. 
Overall, this suggests that foreign investors generate positive return because they have an 
information advantage. 
 
Keywords:  Norwegian Equity Mutual Funds, Carharts Alpha, Local vs. Foreigners, Capital 
Asset Flow, Investor Behavior, Home bias, Irrational bias, Different Risk 
Profiles, Information Advantage. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The goal of this paper is two-fold. On one hand, we want to investigate how Norwegian 
equity mutual funds perform, namely if they generate a positive return. On the other hand, we 
want to address the topic of home bias in Norwegian mutual funds by exploring capital 
inflows and outflows by locals (Norwegians) versus foreigners (non-Norwegians). 
Using Carharts four-factor model (1997), we find that only 6 per cent of the Norwegian 
mutual funds in our sample in the time period 1990 – 2012 generate a statistically significant 
positive alpha, with a monthly mean and median of 0.0043. We also find that an equally-
weighted portfolio of the Norwegian mutual funds generates a significantly monthly alpha of 
-0.00415 during the same period. 
Exploring differences between locals and foreigners, we find strong evidence that: historical 
3-month returns predict larger 1-month change in foreign capital assets than in local capital 
assets, with coefficients of 1.997 and 1.564; changes in foreign capital assets predicts 3- and 
6-month returns better than changes in local capital assets, with foreign coefficients of 0.040 
and 0.034 and local coefficients of 0.014 and 0.008; controlling for risk, foreigners still 
outperform locals. Constructing a value-weighted portfolio where we buy (sell) the five 
mutual funds that have the highest inflow (outflow) for both foreigners and locals, we find 
that foreigners generate a monthly positive significant alpha of 0.00398, while locals do not. 
The first part of this paper addresses the performance of Norwegian mutual funds. There has 
been extensive research on how to measure fund performance, and various methods of 
analysis are available (Markowitz 1952; Sharpe 1964; Lintner 1965; Mossin 1966; Fama-
French 1993; Carhart 1997 among others). Over the last decades, there has been a boom in 
number of mutual funds, and the competition in attracting investors has increased. The main 
goal of an investor is to increase his wealth, and mutual funds give investors the possibility to 
invest in markets they might not have any knowledge or time to participate in.  
Most papers find that mutual funds do not outperform their suitable reference index, and that 
the funds with the worst performance, greatly reduce investors’ wealth (Carhart 1997; 
Nitzsche, Cuthbertson and O’Sullivan 2006; Fama-French 2008; Elton, Gruber and Blake 
2008 among others). Hendricks, Jayendu and Zeckhauser (1997) examines US equity mutual 
funds from 1974-1988, and find that portfolios of recent poor performance do significantly 
worse than the benchmark, and those of recent top performers do better, though not 
significantly so. Brown and Goetzman (1995) among others, find the same evidence in short 
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term performance. Daniel et al. (1997) find evidence that particularly aggressive-growth funds 
exhibit some stock-picking ability, but that funds exhibit no characteristic timing ability 
compared to a benchmark of 125 passive funds. Carhart (1992) shows that persistence in 
expense ratios, drives much of the long-term persistence in mutual fund performance. For 
further discussion about mutual fund performance, see Carhart (1997). 
In the second part of the paper, we investigate home bias by investigating capital assets 
changes in Norwegian equity mutual funds. To be more specific, we want to see if there are 
systematic differences in capital allocation between locals (Norwegians) and foreigners (non-
Norwegians), and if so, what are the reasons behind and do they lead to superior performance. 
We find several previous papers on this topic. Some find that foreigners outperform the 
locals, while others find that locals outperform the foreigners. The common argument in these 
papers is that the investor group that outperform, seems to have better information and thus is 
able to generate abnormal returns. 
(Grinblatt and Keloharju 2000; Seasholes 2000 and among others) uncover evidence from 
both stock picking and mutual funds, that foreigners beat the locals because they have better 
resources, know-how and timing. Foreigners buy winning stocks and sell losing stocks, while 
locals tend to be contrariwise. Froot and Ramadorai (2001) look at US closed-end country 
equity funds and find that foreign change in capital assets predict higher returns compared to 
the locals. While this paper focus on the information and price pressure stories in closed-end 
funds, our paper focus on irrational bias, different risk profiles and information advanteges in 
open-end mutual funds. Froot, O’Connel and Seasholes (2000) focus on international traders 
and find that capital assets are strongly influenced by past return, and foreign inflows predict 
return. The difference from this paper compared to ours is that they do not emphasize on the 
local investors. 
The argument of locals having an edge over foreigners comes from the composition of local 
demographic information and international expertise. Brennan et al. (2005) find that 
foreigners show higher exposure to markets after positive returns. In other words, foreigners 
are less informed, since they react on lagged information. Several papers (Hau 2001; Choe, 
Kho and Stulz 2005; Dvořák 2005) use spectral decomposition in trading data and find that 
foreigners do not outperform the locals. Hau (2001) finds significant underperformance by 
foreigners in all intra-periods. Choe, Kho and Stulz (2005) and Dvořák (2005) find that 
foreigners trade at a worse price than locals. Kang and Stultz (1997) study non-Japanese 
ownership in the Japanese market, and find that foreigners do not hold portfolios in large 
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firms, but are more tilted toward small firms with higher risk and leverage. Shukla and 
Inwegen (1995) find similar results in the American market that foreigners (UK) perform 
worse than locals (US) and conclude that the US manager advantage is simply due to an 
information advantage. 
To our knowledge, behavioral differences between local and foreigner investors has not been 
investigated for Norwegian equity mutual funds. Using changes in capital assets, historical 
returns and various other control variables, we evaluate if foreigners behavior differ from 
locals. To incorporate risk, we do a risk analysis to see if possible differences in behavior are 
due to asymmetric information or simply excessive risk taking. 
In the first part of our analysis, we investigate fund performance to see if they generate a 
positive return. We use Carharts four-factor model (1997), an extension of Fama-French 
(1993), and find that most funds in the time period 1990 – 2012 do not have a positive 
statistically significant alpha. In fact, only 6 per cent of the funds were able to outperform the 
benchmark with a monthly mean and median of 0.0043. We also find that investing in an 
equally-weighted portfolio of mutual funds in the time periods 1990-2012 and 1990-2002 
obtains statistically significant alphas of -0.00415 and -0.00637. Our findings suggest that 
Norwegian equity mutual funds do not generate positive significant return once we control for 
standard factors of risk. We exclude transaction costs since accurate data is not available.  
Constructing an equally-weighted portfolio of 32 Norwegian mutual funds, we find the 12-
month backward rolling betas with Carharts four-factor model (1997). In the time period 
before 2002 we find more volatile betas than after, and it seems that the average fund manager 
changed his strategy after the IT-crisis. The average funds beta is closer to one after 2002, 
suggesting there are more uncertainty and less willingness to take risk in the last decade.  
In our second part, we use our data from Verdipapirfondenes Forening (VFF 2013) to 
illustrate how capital assets fluctuate in Norwegian mutual funds in the time period 2006 – 
2012. Looking at capital assets under management changes (adjusting for fund returns), we 
see that an average investor increased investments before the market dropped in June 2008. 
After separating the foreigners from the locals, we see that over the 18 months leading up to 
December 2009, the foreigners increase their position by 100 per cent whilst locals increased 
their position by 30 per cent. Even though our illustrations show a bigger increase for 
foreigners than locals in per cent, the locals contributes with more than 90 per cent of the 
money invested over the time period. Further on, we observe that foreign investors have more 
volatile cash flows than locals. 
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Next, we examine if historic returns can predict changes in capital assets. For the average 
investor, we find that historical 1-month positive return predict a decrease in 1-month capital 
assets with a statistically significant coefficient of -0.654, which is a surprising result. 
Historical 3-month positive returns predict an increase in capital assets with a coefficient of 
1.654. After splitting up the investors in foreigners and locals, we find that historical 1-, 3- 
and 6-month returns predict changes in foreign capital assets, with coefficients of -0.828, 
1.997 and -0.556. For the local investors we find that historical 1- and 3-month returns predict 
changes in local capital assets with coefficients of -0.683 and 1.564. We expand the analysis 
to see if the difference between foreign and local coefficients is significantly different from 
zero. We find that only the 3-month historic return coefficients are different from each other. 
This tells us there is strong evidence that historical 3-month returns predicts larger 1-month 
changes in foreign capital assets than in local capital assets, which means foreigners chase 
performance more than locals. 
Our analysis shows that foreigners and locals do not position themselves in the same way. If 
differences in capital inflows and outflows between foreigners and locals are due to 
informational advantages or different risk profiles then we should observe differences in 
performance.  We look at 1-month changes in foreign capital assets and local capital assets to 
see if it predicts mutual funds returns. We find that a positive change in foreign capital assets 
predict positive 1-, 3- and 6-month returns with coefficients of 0.015, 0.040 and 0.034. For 
locals, we find that a positive change in capital assets predict positive 3- and 6-month returns 
with coefficients 0.014 and 0.008. We test if the difference between the estimated coefficients 
for locals and foreigners are significantly different from zero. Our tests show that the 3- and 
6-month are different from each other within a 99 per cent confidence interval. This tell us 
that there is strong evidence that change in foreign capital assets predict 3- and 6-month 
returns better than the change in local capital assets, and we can reject the irrational bias story. 
We find that foreigners predict performance better than the locals, but that could be a 
consequence of superior information or a more risk oriented profile. It could simply be 
because foreigners invest in more growth firms than locals, or that foreigners follow a 
momentum strategy and locals do not. To evaluate this, we do a risk strategy analysis to see if 
foreigners still outperform the locals after controlling for risk. We construct a value-weighted 
portfolio where we buy (sell) the five funds that have the highest inflow (outflow) of money 
each month, for both foreigners and locals. Then, using Carharts four-factor model (1997), we 
find that foreigners generate a significant monthly alpha of 0.00398, while locals do not. This 
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tells us that foreigners generate a positive return, on top of risk, and suggests that foreigners 
have an information advantage.  
This paper is structured as follows: Chapter 2 provides a literature review on the relevant 
topics for this paper. Chapter 3 develops our hypotheses. Chapter 4 describes the 
methodology, dataset, assumption and approaches used in the empirical analysis, while 
chapter 5 presents the empirical findings. Chapter 6 provides a discussion of our results and 
limitations, and chapter 7 concludes.  
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2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 Performance Measurement 
 
In 1952, Harry Markowitz started developing a theory to identify the optimal mean-variance 
portfolio, which later on would be known as the Markowitz-frontier. This analytic approach, 
which addresses the impact of risk in stock prices, planted the seed of many researches in the 
topic of portfolio optimization. Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966), all building 
on Markowitz’s (1952) earlier work, developed the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). To 
find the expected price of a security or portfolio, the model use expected return of the market, 
the risk free rate and reward-to-volatility. Later on Fama-French (1993) identifies five 
common risk factors in the return on stock and bond, and expanded the CAPM with two extra 
explanatory variables; SMB, small minus big firm, and HML, value minus growth firms. 
They find that by including SMB and HML, r-squared increases from 0.7 in CAPM to 0.9 in 
Fama-French three-factor model. Carhart (1997) introduced one extra factor, known as 
momentum (MOM). Carhart (1997) find that much of what appears to be the alpha of many 
mutual funds could in fact be explained as due to their loading or sensitivity to market 
momentum (Bodie, Kane and Marcus 2011). 
There has been a lot of research on mutual fund performance. Most papers finds that few 
funds outperform the reference index (Carhart 1997; Nitzsche, Cuthbertson and O’Sullivan 
2006; Fama-French 2008; Elton, Gruber and Blake 2008 among others), and the funds that 
perform the worst lose a lot compared to the benchmark. Brown and Goetzmann (1995) 
indicate that relative risk-adjusted performance of US mutual funds persists; however, 
persistence is mostly due to funds that lag the S&P 500. They also find that funds that 
perform poorly have an increase in the probability of disappearance. Daniel et al. (1997) find 
evidence that mutual funds, particularly aggressive-growth funds, exhibit some stock-picking 
ability, but that these funds exhibit no characteristic timing ability. Hendricks, Jayendu and 
Zeckhauser (1993) examines US mutual funds, and find that portfolios of recent poor 
performance do significantly worse than the reference index, and those who do better, do not 
yield any significant results. Carhart (1997) demonstrate that persistence in mutual fund 
performance does not reflect superior stock-picking skills. Common factors in stock returns 
and persistent differences in mutual fund expenses and transaction costs explain almost all of 
the predictability in mutual fund returns. Only the strong, persistent underperformance by the 
worst-return mutual funds remains anomalous. 
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2.2 Home Bias and Differences between Local and Foreign Investors 
 
The home bias puzzle describes the fact that investors hold only modest amounts in foreign 
markets. That individuals and institutions overweight their national market was first 
documented by French and Poterba (1991), Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) and Tesar and 
Werner (1995). The bias occurs, despite the purported benefits from international 
diversification shown by Solnik (1974), DeSantis and Gerard (1997) among others, and is 
now a widely accepted phenomenon by international investors. 
There are several possible explanations proposed to solve this puzzle: Black and Fischer 
(1974) and Stulz (1981) focused on barriers to international investments, restrictions set by 
the government, different tax regulation and high transaction costs. In recent time, these 
obstacles have fallen dramatically but the bias remains strong; Van Nieuwerburgh and 
Veldkamp (2005) find that local investors have a superior information advantage, and this 
explanation seems to replace the assumption of capital immobility.  
In general, researchers separate between using trading and investment data. The methods used 
often depend on data availability. An interesting question is “Who is best informed, or who 
performs better?”, and the evidence to this is mixed. Reasons for such can be that investors’ 
allocation preferences have changed, or that there are simply too many methodology choices.  
A great number of papers compare foreign and local investors in different regions from all 
over the world, for both stocks and funds. The well-known hypothesis is that local investors 
have an advantage, in terms of knowledge, demographic and cultural challenges. There is 
simply not just one solution to the argument.  
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) and Seasholes (2000) are two papers that state that foreigners 
outperform the locals, where they argue that foreigners generally have better resources and 
know-how. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) use a 120 days trading window, and find that 
foreigners are momentum investors who buy (sell) winning (losing) stocks, while locals tend 
to be more contrariwise. Even after Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) control for differences in 
behavior, the local portfolios seem to be in disfavor foreign portfolios, in terms of 
performance. Seasholes (2000) look at earnings announcement in Taiwan. Results indicates 
that foreigners buy ahead of good surprises and sell ahead of bad, which pinpoint that foreign 
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investors in Taiwan outperform the locals. Seasholes (2000) also find evidence that foreigners 
are able to capture abnormal return, based on a daily basis. 
Froot and Ramadorai (2001) examine foreigners’ ability to predict good returns using flow of 
capital assets with an aggregate data approach. They examine closed-end country funds of 25 
different countries and look at the impacts of US institutional equity flows on prices. Their 
results indicate that in US; cross-border flows can predict performance in these countries and 
prices associated with these funds. Thus, foreign investors seem to be informed. The latter 
paper, Froot, O’Connel and Seasholes (2000) have similar conclusion. They find that flow of 
capital assets is strongly influenced by past returns, and foreign inflows predict return, and 
indicate that the sensitivity of local stock prices to foreign inflows is positive and large (Froot, 
O’Connel and Seasholes 2000). All these four papers are consistent with the statement that 
foreigners outperform the locals, and that foreigners are investors with greater sophistication 
that are able to choose more profitable investment strategies. 
On the other side, we have the argument that foreigners are less informed than locals. 
Brennan et al. (2005) extend the paper by Brennan and Cao (1997) to be able to analyze how 
investors’ react to cycles in foreign capital markets. They find that international investors 
show higher exposure to foreign markets after positive returns. Due to this lagged response, 
Brennan et al. (2005) indicates that foreigners are less informed than locals. 
Hau (2001) use spectral decomposition and investigate trading data, and examine who has got 
the best information in the German market; the non-Germans (foreigners) or the Germans 
(locals)? He finds that the foreigners, located in Frankfurt do not outperform the locals. These 
non-German traders also show a significant underperformance in all intra-periods. Choe, Kho 
and Stulz (2005) and Dvořák (2005) have also done similar studies in Korea and Indonesia, 
respectively. They find that foreigners trade at worse prices in both countries. In Korea, 
foreign managers pay more (receive less) than locals when they buy (sell). Choe, Kho and 
Stulz (2005) indicates that domestic investors have an edge, compared to foreigners on 
average daily trades they have an advantage on 0.21 (0.16) per cent for purchases (sales). 
Dvořák (2005) also use spectral decompositions and look at clients of global and local 
brokerages, and find that local clients have an advantage when it comes to medium and short 
term profits. Even though clients with global brokerages are slightly better to predict long-
term winners, the combination of local information and international expertise clearly results 
in higher profits. Hence, the locals experience higher profits than foreigners in Indonesia. 
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Kang and Stulz (1997) study non-Japanese ownership in the Japanese market, they find that 
foreigners do not hold portfolios in large firms with high expected returns in the national 
market, but are more tilted towards small firms with higher risk and leverage. Shukla and 
Inwegen (1995) look at mutual funds and examine UK fund managers’ performance in the 
American market. They find that foreigners (UK) performs worse than locals (US). Hence 
both authors have consistent results. Shukla and Inwegen (1995) conclude that the reason for 
the results simply is information, and to local (US) managers advantage.  
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3. Hypothesis Development 
 
In this paper, we aim to measure the performance of Norwegian registered equity mutual 
funds and to investigate possible differences between local and foreign investors. Our goal is 
to determine if funds generate a significant positive return, if local and foreign investors 
position themselves differently and if one group of investor achieves a better performance.  
Do historical returns predict changes in capital assets? Do changes in capital assets predict 
returns, and if there are any differences, is this due to behavioral bias, excessive risk taking or 
asymmetric information? 
The stock market is often viewed as semi-strong efficient, meaning that stock prices reflect all 
public information, except insider information (Fama 1970). Active portfolio managers 
believe that the market sometimes is mispriced, either that a stock is priced too high or too 
low, and strive to earn this abnormal return. They measure their performance against a 
suitable reference index and try to outperform this by timing and stock-picking. A 
conventional used method of measuring performance is the Carhart four-factor model (1997), 
an extension of the Fama-French three-factor model (1993). The model adjusts returns for 
commonly accepted factors of risk: market, size, growth and momentum; the alpha is then 
what is left from the raw return after adjusting for these risk factors. The alphas can be used to 
compare how well each portfolio manager performs in the same time period and investment 
universe. Most studies on this subject find that few funds outperform the reference index after 
accounting for transaction costs. In other words, most funds do not generate a positive 
significant alpha (Carhart 1997). Based on this, we predict that Norwegian mutual funds will 
not generate positive alpha, and develop our first null hypothesis: 
H_1: Norwegian equity mutual funds do not generate significant positive alphas, excluding 
transaction costs. 
Some of the reasons to invest in mutual funds are due to investors not having the time or the 
knowledge to invest themselves. By outsourcing this to a fund manager, investors get 
exposure to the market they are interested in. Our first hypothesis evaluates if the funds 
outperform the reference index, after controlling for the risk factors. 
Our second hypothesis, evaluate if historic return can predict changes in capital assets. Do 
locals and foreigners respond to the available information the same way? This is an important 
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question, because it tells us how the investors position themselves based on the available 
information. Any deviation between the local and foreign investors, tells us that they value the 
information and opportunities different. We want to investigate if locals and foreigners chase 
performance in the same way. If not, this could be because of behavioral biases, information 
advantages or different risk profiles. It is a known fact that there is a home bias, so there could 
easily be differences in Norwegian mutual funds when we look at local versus foreigners. 
Under the assumption that all investors should have the same public information, we develop 
our second null hypothesis: 
H_2: Historic returns do not predict larger changes in foreign capital assets than locals 
Next, we want to see if positions taken today generate positive return. Do changes in capital 
asset flows predict returns, and if so, is there any difference between foreigners and locals? In 
other words, we want to investigate if the investors are able to place money in the funds that 
performs well in the future. This is a way of testing the behavioral biases versus information 
advantages and different risk profiles. If the differences are based on irrational biases, this 
will lead to bad performance. If we see good performance this eliminates the irrational bias 
story, which leads us to our third null hypothesis: 
H_3: Changes in foreign capital assets do not predict return better than locals 
Finally, we want to do a risk strategy analysis, to investigate if good performance comes from 
excessive risk taking or information advantages. We construct a value-weighted portfolio 
where we buy (sell) the five funds that have the highest inflow (outflow) of money for both 
foreigners and locals. Then, using Carharts four factor model (1997), we can see if 
foreigners/locals generate a positive alpha. If the analysis generates a significant positive 
alpha, it tells us that excessive risk is not the reason for good performance. From this we 
develop our final null hypothesis: 
H_4: Foreign investors do not outperform local investors, controlling for risk  
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4. Methodology and Data Description 
 
4.1 Regression Models 
 
In this chapter, we present our methodology used in the empirical analysis chapter. We 
describe the models, dataset, assumptions and approaches used in the paper. 
4.1.1 Capital Asset Pricing Model 
 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) was first introduced by Sharpe (1964), Lintner 
(1965) and Mossin (1966), all building on earlier work from Markowitz (1952).  Bodie, Kane 
and Marcus (2011) explain that the CAPM is a set of prediction concerning equilibrium 
expected returns on risky assets. The assumptions of the model can be summarized as 
follows; investors are price-takers, only trades in financial assets, no taxes, are rational mean-
variance optimizing and have homogeneous expectations. The CAPM model: 
 (  )          [ (  )    ]     (1) 
Where,  (  ) = expected return of fund i,    = risk-free rate,    = deviation from SML,        
   = portfolios reward-to-volatility, [ (  )    ] = market risk premium,    = residual. 
4.1.2 Fama-French three-factor model 
 
Fama-French (1993) identifies five common risk factors in the return on stocks and bonds. 
We focus on the three stock-market factors; the overall market factor, the small minus big 
firms, SMB, and the value minus growth firms, HML. Bodie, Kane and Marcus (2011) 
illustrates that these additional factors are empirically motivated by the observations, that 
average historic returns on stocks of small firms and on stocks with high ratios of book-to-
market equity are higher than predicted by the SML from CAPM. The Fama-French three-
factor model: 
 (  )          [ (  )    ]     [   ]     [   ]       (2) 
Where coefficients   ,    and    are the beta of the fund on each of the three factors. 
According to the arbitrage pricing model, if these are the relevant factors, excess return 
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should be fully explained by risk premium due to these factor loadings. In other words, the 
intercept of the equation should be zero.  
How the factors are constructed is shown in French (2013). We use the work of Professor 
Bernt Arne Ødegaard. He finds the SMB and HML factors calculated by Fama and French, 
using Norwegian data (Ødegaard 2013). 
4.1.3 Carharts momentum factor 
 
Carhart (1997) suggests extending the Fama-French three-factor model with a fourth factor 
called PR1YR, from now on referred to as MOM. He finds that much of what appears to be 
the alpha of many mutual funds could in fact be explained as due to their loadings or 
sensitivity to market momentum (Bodie, Kane and Marcus 2011). Carharts four-factor model: 
 (  )          [ (  )    ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]     (3) 
Where the coefficient,   , is the estimated beta of the funds MOM factor. We use the MOM 
factor from Ødegaard (2013) of Norwegian data. We apply the different regression models in 
our empirical analysis, but our main focus is the results from Carharts four-factor model. 
4.1.4 Backward rolling beta estimates in the average fund 
 
By finding the backward rolling betas we can investigate how exposed the average fund is to 
the market in the time period 1990 – 2012. It also tells us if there have been any changes in 
investment strategies. We use the EW portfolio from the 32 mutual funds as our average fund 
return, and OSEFX/MSCI1 as our reference index. From Carharts four-factor model (1997) 
we find the 12-month backward rolling betas and compare it with the OSEFX/MSCI market 
price. 
4.2 Pearson Chi-squared Testing of Coefficient Estimates 
 
We also want to compare coefficients in regressions where you use data on locals and data on 
foreigners and test if these coefficients are different. This we can do with the Pearson Chi-
squared test, and compare the difference between two coefficients and see if they are 
significant different from zero. The Pearson Chi-squared test of independence: 
                                                 
1 OSEFX/MSCI represents 80 per cent in OSEFX (and TOTX before January 1996), and 20 per cent in MSCI 
ACWI large/mid-capitalization. See section 4.3.3 Indices for explanation. 
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     (4) 
Where the independence reduces the number of freedom by p = r + c – 1.2 
4.3 Data Description and Sample Selection 
 
4.3.1 Dataset 
 
Our dataset consists of historical monthly returns for different reference indices and funds 
from all over the world over the time period January 1990 until August 2012, retrieved from 
Børsprosjektet at NHH. Out of the 3475 funds and indices, 74 are Norwegian equity mutual 
funds. The period constitutes 272 months, and a total of 11,660 month-fund observations. 
Ideally we would like to base the analysis on all the 74 funds, but since we have incomplete 
dataset for investor information, we restrict number of funds to 32 to get matching datasets. 
See section 4.4.1 for explanation. 
After the two datasets are determined, we choose five time periods to be used for further 
analysis: 
1. 1990m1 - 2012m8  
2. 1990m1 - 2002m10 
3. 2002m10 - 2008m12  
4. 2006m1 - 2012m8  
5. 2008m12 - 2012m8  
The first one represents the whole dataset, the fourth time period match the investor 
information, while second, third and fifth represents periods before and after recessions. 
2002m10 and 2008m12 are months where the economy reaches lowest values measured in 
OSEFX/MSCI market price. 
  
                                                 
2 In section 5.3 Historic return predictability of changes in capital assets and 5.4 Change in capital assets 
predictability of return we do the regressions without robust in STATA, since Pearson Chi-squared test 
generates robust standard deviation by itself.  
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4.3.2 Portfolio returns 
 
All returns are arithmetic and collected from net asset value (NAV). The returns are adjusted 
for dividend payments, where dividends are reinvested to the last inclusive dividend price 
with the subject dividend subtracted. Total return is calculated according to the following 
formula (OsloBors 2013a): 
      (
  
   
 (∏ 
 
   
 
  
       
))                  
                                   
                            
                                                     
                               [    ] are included 
                                                 
All returns and dividends are calculated in NOK, and the fund price exclude redemption fee 
and sales charge. Denote: 
                   
                        
                                      
                                      
                                        
 
We also compute forward returns, the structure is similar to historical but instead of t-1 we 
now use t+1. We skip 12-month and use; 1-, 3- and 6-month forward returns, because it is 
very difficult to predict 12-month. Here is an overview: 
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4.3.3 Indices 
 
Most of the Norwegian equity mutual funds restrict themselves that at least 80 per cent of the 
capital needs to be invested on Oslo Bors. Some of the funds use OSEAX (all shares listed on 
OSE) and OSEBX (most traded shares listed on OSE) as a reference index. The majority use 
OSEFX (mutual fund index) which is a capped version of OSEBX, and we therefore choose 
to use this one. Since we only have data from 1996m1-2012m8 for OSEFX, we use returns 
from TOTX3 in the missing period 1990m1-1995m12 (OsloBors 2013b). 
Close price and arithmetic returns are used for indices. The funds have the possibility to 
invest up to 20 per cent internationally. In our original dataset we have the most commonly 
used international index from January 1999 – August 2012, the MSCI ACWI. To be able to fit 
this index for the whole period we downloaded MSCI ACWI large/mid-cap in the time period 
January 1990 – August 2012 from MSCI (2013), and the monthly currency USD/NOK from 
Datastream and converted the index into NOK. Since the difference was minor (∆ < 0.05 per 
cent) between the two indices, we decide to use the MSCI ACWI large/mid-cap index (MSCI 
2013).  
From this we can construct a new index that represents the investor universe for the 
Norwegian funds, with 80 per cent in OSEFX/TOTX and 20 per cent in MSCI ACWI 
large/mid-cap. We name it OSEFX/MSCI, and this index will be our reference index 
throughout the paper. 
4.3.4 Risk-free rate 
 
We downloaded our risk-free rates from the Norwegian central bank (Norges Bank 2013). 
Since our observations in the dataset are based on monthly returns, we choose to use the 1-
month nominal rate of interest (NIBOR). Most of the funds are a branch within a bank, and 
therefore it would be reasonable to use the NIBOR rate as the risk-free rate, because this is the 
rate banks are willing to loan money to each other. The differences from using longer horizon 
are nevertheless trivial; hence the final choice does not affect our results substantially. 
  
                                                 
3 TOTX (Total Index) was the former index used on Oslo Bors. They abandon this officially in September 2001. 
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4.3.5 Equally-weighted and value-weighted portfolio 
 
We constructed an equally-weighted portfolio of the 32 funds (EW32). In the calculation we 
add the monthly returns Ri of all the funds, and then divide the total return by the number of 
funds n. For each period t, the equally-weighted portfolio   
   return is calculated: 
  
   
 
 
∑  
 
   
 
The value-weighted (VW) portfolios are based on the funds’ market capitalization (MC), 
retrieved from VFF (2013). Where n is the number of funds and MCi is the market 
capitalization of fund i in the portfolio p. The VW portfolio return   
   is then specified with 
the formula: 
   
   ∑ (     )
 
    ,     
   
∑    
 
   
 
4.3.6 Survival bias 
 
Our dataset are to some extent free from survival bias, since through an on-going evaluation, 
we always included non-surviving funds. When funds have been excluded it has been because 
of incomplete investor data or too few total investors. 
4.3.7 Variable construction 
 
One of the most important variables in the dataset is capital asset; for total, foreigners and 
locals. Since we look at percentage change from month to month, extreme values occur. In 
natural cases, where e.g. fund is established or goes bankrupt, the change in capital assets can 
be as much as 1000 per cent, or higher. Regressions are vulnerable for extreme values, even 
though it not represents any technical errors, it will have huge effects on the final result. 
Without any adjustment all regression yield zero r-squared. To cope with this problem we 
decide to winsorize data at a 1 per cent level. 
Denote total, foreign and local capital assets as TOT, FOR and LOC. The control variable 
SIZE is the same as TOT. 
Denote total, foreign and local percentage change in capital assets as TOTP, FORP and 
LOCP. The calculation for TOTP is capital asset from period t, TOTt, subtracted and divided 
with last month capital asset, TOTt-1. The same approach applies for FORP and LOCP: 
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We also use changes in capital assets the month before as one of our control variables. When 
you make a decision in period t, you cannot use TOTP to compare capital assets flow. By 
using t-1, we can now use historical information in the regressions to see if it has any effect. 
We write these variables as TOTPt1, FORPt1 and LOCPt1, and it is calculated as follows: 
       
              
      
 
To compute one of the control variables used in the regression, called artificial inflow, we 
multiply previous month return (T1) with total capital assets (TOTt). E.g. let’s say we have a 
couple of funds with the same return in January, with this variable we are able to control if the 
big firm attracts more capital in February than a small firm with equal return the month 
before. 
Artificial Inflow = T1 * TOT 
We will also control our regression for time and fund effects. For example, by controlling for 
time effect in our dataset, we make sure that if there are months with extraordinary incidents 
this variable will identify and separate the effect. E.g. if Russia, because of monetary policies 
has excess cash in May 2007 and randomly invest everything in Norwegian mutual funds, the 
effect will be excluded. Likewise, we give each fund unique numbers from 1-32, the flagfund 
variable deal with extraordinary monthly returns.  
4.3.8 Organizing the data 
 
After we calculate all variables, we organized each month: 2006m1 = F1-F32, and 2006m2 = 
F1-F32 … 2012m8 = F1-F32, where F stands for fund. With a total of 80 months from 
January 2006 to August 2012, we end up with 2560 observations for part two in the paper. 
See section 4.4.1 for explanation of why we start in January 2006. This dataset now consist of 
20 variables; eight of them represent our historic and forward returns; total, foreign and local 
capital assets have all three variables each: size, change in capital asset for period t and t-1; 
the three last variables are time effect, flagfund and artificial inflow.  
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4.4 Investor Behavior 
 
4.4.1 Capital assets and investor information  
 
The part with investor information is only 80 months of data 2006m1-2012m8 for the 32 
Norwegian equity mutual funds (VFF 2013). The reason why this dataset has a shorter time 
period than the one used in the performance analysis, is because that the investor information 
is not available before 2001, and in the time period 2001 – 2006 there is only quarterly data. 
An option to extend the dataset was to change the years after 2006 from monthly to quarterly, 
but this would have led to an undesirable shrinkage of the final number of observations. We 
therefore decide to use monthly observations, and reduce number of months from 272 to 80.  
Further on, we set restriction that each fund must have at least 12 months of information in 
both dataset, and we exclude funds with less than 50 total investors. Eight of the funds were 
excluded because they were index funds, eleven of the funds had no investor information at 
all, and thirteen funds had no foreign investors. Five of the funds had less than 50 total 
investors, and we exclude Warren Wicklund Alpha because this fund became a combination 
fund in 2008. These adjustments was necessary to end up with a matching dataset, number of 
funds were therefore reduced from 74 to 32. We are now able to compare the two investor 
types under equal conditions, see section 4.3.1. 
The dataset contains an overview of capital asset for; total, foreign and local investors, and 
represent both private and institutional investors. The locals are Norwegians and foreigners 
are non-Norwegians. We will not distinguish between private and institutional, and 
throughout the paper only focus on the foreigners and locals as the two investor types. 
The change in capital assets can be divided into two parts, returns and investors cash flows. 
To be able to separate these two, and see how much each contributes, we eliminate the gains 
and losses from the capital assets. We do so by using January 2006 as the starting point and 
add net money cash flow for February 2006 to the normalized total capital asset. We then end 
up with an adjusted approximation of capital assets that only reflects investors’ cash flow.   
                                                            
                                                               
… 
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4.5 Regression Methodology 
 
All regressions are performed in STATA, and to control for heteroscedasticity we run all 
regressions with the robust function.  
4.5.1 Historic return predictability of changes in capital assets 
 
In this section our dependent variables are TOTP, FORP and LOCP. Our independent 
variables are historic returns for 1-, 3-, 6- and 12-month. We are also controlling for size, time 
effect, previous month return multiplied with size (artificial inflow), flagfund and change in 
capital assets last month (TOTPt1, FORPt1 and LOCPt1). The structure is based on adding 
variables; firstly we run all historical returns separately before we merge them and get the 
final regression for TOTP, FORP and LOCP: 
                                                                                 
4.5.2 Changes in capital assets predictability of return 
 
Our dependent variables are the 1-, 3- and 6-month forward returns. The independent 
variables are TOTP, FORP and LOCP. In addition we also control for size, time effect, 
historic returns (T1, T3 and T6) and flagfund. All variables are explained in section 4.3.  
                                                                
4.5.3 Risk strategy analysis 
 
After looking on how foreign and local cash flows can predict performance, we now shift our 
view to risk. The previous section only evaluates if foreigners can predict returns better than 
the locals, which simply can come from foreigners having a different risk profile. If for 
example foreigners follow a momentum strategy, and the locals do not, then this can cause the 
foreigners to predict performance better than the locals. To cope with this, we construct a 
portfolio for the two investor types, and compare them with the market to see if they create a 
positive significant alpha or not. 
First of all we need to organize our data. In each month, the 32 funds have different in- and 
outflow of money. Some of them have no change in capital asset. We want to construct a 
portfolio where we buy the 5 funds with highest inflow and short the 5 funds with highest 
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outflow of money, from now on called 5 HIGH and 5 LOW. In some months, the 32 funds 
have all positive or negative FORP. If all are positive (negative), we buy the 5 funds that are 
most positive (closest to zero) FORP and sell the 5 that are less positive (farthest from zero) 
FORP. 
We first exclude the funds with FORP equal to zero, since we want to look on the funds 
where foreigners invest or sell. In each month we have total capital assets held by foreigners, 
and from this we can find the value-weights (VW). By multiplying the VW with their 
respectively HIGH and the LOW 1-month forward returns (T1), we now have the 5 HIGH 
and 5 LOW portfolios. The difference between 5 HIGH and 5 LOW is the same as buying the 
5 highest inflow of money and shorting the 5 highest outflow of money each month. We do 
the same procedure for LOCP.  
This gives us a total of 156 observation; 78 for foreigners and 78 for locals. We then subtract 
the 1-month NIBOR from the foreign portfolios, local portfolios and the OSEFX/MSCI 
reference index, to find the excess return. We can now employ the Carhart four-factor model 
to analyze our data and see if the alpha is significant or not, see section 5.5 for results. 
In the approach above we assume that we can short sell a fund. In practice this is not possible, 
since we do not know the funds composition of stocks each month, and even if we did, the 
transaction cost would go through the roof. As an alternative we can buy the 5 HIGH and buy 
the 5 LOW portfolios, and use the four-factor model to see what side the alpha comes from. 
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5. Empirical Analysis 
 
In this chapter we present our empirical findings from the performance analysis, rolling betas, 
adjusted capital asset, historical regressions, forward regressions and risk strategy. 
5.1 Performance Measurement – Alpha 
 
Here we present our results from the performance analysis of the mutual funds. We analyze 
the data with CAPM, Fama-French three-factor and Carharts four-factor model. Our main 
results are the alphas from the four-factor model, and the two other models act as robustness 
tests. We use the alphas to test the hypothesis H_1 and analyze if the funds generates a 
significant return after adjusting for the risk factors. The null hypothesis predicts that 
Norwegian mutual funds do not generate significant positive alpha, excluding transaction 
costs. In appendix A1-A4 we show the estimated coefficients of the beta, HML, SMB and 
MOM as shown with alpha in table 1 and 2. 
5.1.1 Time periods 
 
In each time period we discuss the most significant alphas from the four-factor model. We 
also construct an equally-weighted (EW) portfolio of the 32 funds to see how an average 
investor performs. The last two time periods also include the value-weighted (VW) portfolio.4 
January 1990 – August 2012 
WW Norge Verdi and Pareto Aksje Norge are the only two funds that have a positive monthly 
alpha of 0.00428 and 0.00425, significant within a 95 per cent confidence interval. We see 
that these funds did not exist before 2003 and 2001, which can explain some of the positive 
results. As we will see, the time period before 2003 generates mostly negative alphas.  
The EW portfolio gives us a monthly alpha of -0.00415, significant within a 99 per cent 
confidence interval. This tells us that on average, the mutual funds did not produce a 
sufficient excess return in this period. 
January 1990 – October 2002 
In this time period we find the most discouraging results. There are three funds that have a 
negative alpha, significant within a 95 per cent confidence interval; AFB Norge, DNB Avanse 
                                                 
4 VW is calculated only in periods after 2006, because of incomplete investor dataset. See section 4.4.1 Capital 
assets and investor information. 
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1 and DNB Avanse 2 with monthly alphas of -0.00334, -0.00283 and -0.00367. All three 
funds have been active in the time period, so few observations are not an explanation of the 
poor performance.  
The EW portfolio gives us a monthly alpha of -0.00637, significant within a 99 per cent 
confidence interval. This was the time period with the worst EW alpha.  
October 2002 – December 2008 
Some of the best performances measured in alpha are from this time period. There are four 
funds that have a positive significant alpha; DF Norge 2, Holberg Norge, Storebrand Aksje 
Innland and WW Norge Verdi with monthly alpha of 0.00378, 0.00789, 0.00338 and 0.00717. 
Some of this can be explained by the boom in the stock markets up to the financial crisis in 
late 2008. 
The EW portfolio gives us a monthly alpha of -0.00152, but no significant results. 
January 2006 – August 2012 
This is the time period we focus on in chapter 5.2 - 5.5. There are three funds that distinguish 
themselves from the rest with positive significant alphas: DF Norge 1, DF Norge 2 and WW 
Norge Verdi with monthly alphas of 0.00363, 0.00432 and 0.00390. 
The EW and VW portfolio gives us a monthly alpha of -0.00140 and 0.00066, respectively, 
but no significant results. 
December 2008 – August 2012 
This time period show how the funds performed after the financial crisis. There are two funds 
that distinguish themselves from the rest; Holberg Norge and Storebrand Vekst with monthly 
significant alphas of -0.00614 and 0.00836. 
The EW and VW portfolio gives us a monthly alpha of -0.00158 and -0.00111, respectively, 
but no significant results
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Table 1 – Performance Measurement – Alpha Overview 
Ref. Index: OSEFX/MSCI Jan 1990 - Aug 2012 Jan 1990 - Oct 2002 
Living time: N Fund name: 
CAPM 3-factor 4-factor CAPM 3-factor 4-factor 
199601-201208 200 AFB Aktiv 0.00159 0.00035 -0.00046 0.00386 -0.00213 -0.00255 
199710-201208 179 AFB Kapital 0.00097 0.00007 -0.00048 0.00114 -0.00448 -0.00433 
199011-201208 262 AFB Norge -0.00068 -0.00065 -0.00089 -0.00272* -0.00330** -0.00334** 
199801-201208 176 AFB Norge Pluss 0.00197 0.00199 0.00164 0.00063 -0.00021 -0.00019 
199508-201208 205 Carnegie Aksje Norge 0.00302** 0.00322** 0.00229 0.00518* 0.00432 0.00363 
199407-201208 218 Delphi Norge 0.00347 0.00204 0.00164 0.00469 0.00084 0.00029 
199711-201208 178 Delphi Vekst 0.00212 0.00124 0.00085 0.00820 0.00374 0.00319 
199402-201208 223 DF Norge 1 0.00079 0.00100 0.00128 -0.00041 -0.00080 -0.00023 
199402-201208 223 DF Norge 2 0.00130 0.00153 0.00182 -0.00003 -0.00035 0.00020 
199402-201208 223 DF Norge Vekst 0.00409 0.00209 0.00103 0.00771 0.00086 -0.00016 
199001-201208 272 DNB 1 -0.00075 -0.00026 -0.00045 -0.00233* -0.00215 -0.00217 
199603-201208 198 DNB 3 0.00083 0.00128 0.00108 -0.00067 -0.00074 -0.00046 
199001-201208 272 DNB Avanse 1 -0.00116 -0.00094 -0.00094 -0.00232* -0.00286** -0.00283** 
199101-201208 260 DNB Avanse 2 -0.00129 -0.00106 -0.00114 -0.00304** -0.00368*** -0.00367*** 
199605-201208 196 DNB Selektiv 1 0.00149 0.00159 0.00186 0.00076 -0.00040 0.00073 
199504-201208 209 Handelsbanken Norge -0.00028 -0.00026 -0.00058 -0.00060 -0.00158 -0.00184 
200101-201208 140 Holberg Norge 0.00294 0.00266 0.00279 0.00471 0.00456 0.00426 
199609-201208 192 NB-Aksjefond -0.00095 -0.00110 -0.00069 -0.00094 -0.00090 -0.00034 
199001-201208 272 Nordea Avkastning -0.00035 0.00007 0.00004 -0.00086 -0.00056 -0.00056 
199504-201208 209 Nordea Kapital 0.00127 0.00133 0.00117 0.00174 0.00041 0.00036 
199706-201208 183 Nordea SMB -0.00006 -0.00139 -0.00142 -0.00223 -0.00637 -0.00602 
199001-201208 272 Nordea Vekst -0.00145 -0.00117 -0.00118 -0.00195 -0.00191 -0.00190 
199207-201208 242 ODIN Norge 0.00422* 0.00201 0.00220 0.00700** 0.00310 0.00346 
199001-201208 272 Orkla Finans Fund 0.00037 0.00008 -0.00007 0.00018 -0.00112 -0.00115 
200110-201208 131 Pareto Aksje Norge 0.00535** 0.00499** 0.00425** 0.01894* 0.01447 0.01708 
200601-201208 80 Pareto Verdi 0.00091 0.00124 0.00152    
199608-201208 193 Storebrand Aksje Innland 0.00087 0.00130 0.00092 -0.00121 -0.00145 -0.00130 
199001-201208 272 Storebrand Norge 0.00031 0.00042 0.00032 -0.00043 -0.00086 -0.00087 
199210-201208 239 Storebrand Vekst 0.00232 0.00158 0.00122 0.00265 0.00098 0.00030 
199801-201208 176 Storebrand Verdi 0.00259 0.00313* 0.00244 0.00335 0.00438 0.00452 
199805-201208 172 Terra Norge 0.00082 0.00076 0.00060 0.00239 0.00057 0.00059 
200310-201208 107 WW Norge Verdi 0.00404** 0.00400** 0.00428**    
199001-201208 272 Equally-Weighted portfolio -0.00366*** -0.00395*** -0.00415*** -0.00543*** -0.00630*** -0.00637*** 
In this table we present our alphas in alphabetic order for all the 32 funds, for the CAPM, 3- and 4-factor model. The two time periods are: Jan 1990-Aug 2012 and Jan 1990-Oct 2002. Column 
1 and 2 shows the living time and number of monthly observations. Missing values mean that the fund didn’t exist. Significance at a 10, 5 and 1 per cent level is indicated as *, ** and *** 
respectively. 
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Table 2 – Performance Measurement Continued – Alpha Overview 
Ref. Index: OSEFX/MSCI  
Fund name: 
     Oct 2002 - Dec 2008  Jan 2006 - Aug 2012  Dec 2008 - Aug 2012 
CAPM 3-factor 4-factor  CAPM 3-factor 4-factor  CAPM 3-factor 4-factor 
AFB Aktiv 0.00132 0.00152 0.00042  0.00105 0.00098 0.00032  -0.00089 -0.00089 -0.00098 
AFB Kapital 0.00191 0.00194 0.00102  0.00069 0.00067 0.00005  -0.00106 -0.00100 -0.00108 
AFB Norge 0.00250 0.00300* 0.00220  0.00231 0.00239 0.00193  0.00149 0.00168 0.00161 
AFB Norge Pluss 0.00299 0.00350** 0.00276  0.00268* 0.00275* 0.00229  0.00168 0.00185 0.00178 
Carnegie Aksje Norge 0.00229 0.00275 0.00174  0.00195 0.00187 0.00129  -0.00061 -0.00054 -0.00065 
Delphi Norge 0.00504 0.00482 0.00551  0.00190 0.00213 0.00185  0.00087 0.00087 0.00076 
Delphi Vekst 0.00255 0.00237 0.00313  -0.00021 0.00012 0.00006  -0.00237 -0.00223 -0.00232 
DF Norge 1 0.00246 0.00292 0.00302  0.00356* 0.00375* 0.00363*  0.00245 0.00257 0.00252 
DF Norge 2 0.00319 0.00365* 0.00378*  0.00424** 0.00443** 0.00432**  0.00314 0.00325 0.00321 
DF Norge Vekst 0.00037 0.00000 -0.00116  0.00014 0.00019 0.00019  0.00249 0.00255 0.00254 
DNB 1 0.00194 0.00256 0.00184  0.00228 0.00226 0.00154  0.00054 0.00059 0.00048 
DNB 3 0.00260 0.00323* 0.00251  0.00300* 0.00297* 0.00225  0.00120 0.00124 0.00114 
DNB Avanse 1 0.00115 0.00160 0.00143  0.00073 0.00087 0.00074  -0.00112 -0.00092 -0.00092 
DNB Avanse 2 0.00137 0.00177 0.00136  0.00124 0.00137 0.00125  -0.00061 -0.00040 -0.00040 
DNB Selektiv 1 0.00357 0.00398* 0.00380  0.00259 0.00256 0.00191  0.00090 0.00088 0.00077 
Handelsbanken Norge 0.00134 0.00189 0.00115  0.00116 0.00100 0.00112  -0.00317 -0.00329 -0.00311 
Holberg Norge 0.00848*** 0.00833*** 0.00789**  -0.00191 -0.00134 -0.00103  -0.00670** -0.00630** -0.00614** 
NB-Aksjefond -0.00098 -0.00094 -0.00065  -0.00044 0.00035 0.00069  -0.00177 -0.00118 -0.00104 
Nordea Avkastning 0.00004 0.00042 0.00055  0.00118 0.00133 0.00114  0.00057 0.00075 0.00072 
Nordea Kapital 0.00097 0.00138 0.00146  0.00207 0.00220 0.00204  0.00154 0.00171 0.00169 
Nordea SMB 0.00558 0.00480 0.00386  -0.00334 -0.00245 -0.00188  -0.00639 -0.00599 -0.00572 
Nordea Vekst -0.00133 -0.00096 -0.00078  -0.00047 -0.00025 -0.00042  0.00064 0.00097 0.00093 
ODIN Norge 0.00615* 0.00527* 0.00444  -0.00340 -0.00288 -0.00235  -0.00641 -0.00593 -0.00578 
Orkla Finans Fund 0.00123 0.00152 0.00120  0.00107 0.00130 0.00131  -0.00021 0.00011 0.00010 
Pareto Aksje Norge 0.00511* 0.00483 0.00304  0.00211 0.00243 0.00271  0.00041 0.00071 0.00077 
Pareto Verdi 0.00110 0.00126 0.00251  0.00091 0.00124 0.00152  -0.00073 -0.00043 -0.00037 
Storebrand Aksje Innland 0.00349* 0.00411** 0.00338*  0.00275 0.00261 0.00195  0.00111 0.00116 0.00104 
Storebrand Norge 0.00201 0.00242 0.00225  0.00219 0.00230 0.00205  0.00056 0.00074 0.00066 
Storebrand Vekst -0.00130 -0.00116 -0.00022  0.00432 0.00435 0.00506  0.00823* 0.00812* 0.00836* 
Storebrand Verdi 0.00452 0.00526* 0.00290  0.00136 0.00130 0.00038  -0.00254 -0.00232 -0.00243 
Terra Norge 0.00063 0.00126 0.00062  0.00092 0.00148 0.00135  -0.00117 -0.00064 -0.00048 
WW Norge Verdi 0.00739*** 0.00736*** 0.00717***  0.00269 0.00341* 0.00390*  -0.00124 -0.00069 -0.00053 
Equally-Weighted portfolio -0.00140 -0.00125 -0.00152  -0.00146 -0.00127 -0.00140  -0.00160 -0.00155 -0.00158 
Value-Weighted portfolio     0.00051 0.00073 0.00066  -0.00135 -0.00113 -0.00111 
In this table we present the rest of our alphas in alphabetic order for all the 32 funds, for the CAPM, 3- and 4-factor model. For time periods: Oct 2002-Dec 2008, Jan 2006-Aug 2012 and Dec 
2008-Aug 2012. Significance at a 10, 5 and 1 per cent level is indicated as *, ** and *** respectively. 
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5.1.2 Transaction costs 
 
To find the exact transaction costs in each fund accurately proved to be very difficult. At the 
funds homepages, they do not list the historical transaction costs. From Morningstar (2013) 
we are able to find an overview of total costs in recent times, see appendix A5. 
Typically, every fund has a management fee of 1 - 2 per cent annually. The funds we 
contacted by mail, said they used to have sign on/off fees, but the trend is now turning 
towards no fees when buying or selling the fund. One explanation to lower fees can be the 
enhanced competition. In 1990 there were 6 Norwegian funds in our dataset, and in August 
2012 there were 74 Norwegian funds.  
Our performance analysis finds that the fund that have a significant positive alpha vary 
between 4 – 8 per cent annually. Based on the information from Morningstar (2013), these 
funds are able to cover the transaction costs and generate excess return to the investors. Since 
we do not know the exact transaction costs for each fund, we choose not to investigate this 
any further. 
5.1.3 Backward rolling betas 
 
Figure 3 has two inputs. On the left-hand axis we have the backward rolling Beta-values, 
which are regressed from the EW32 with the four-factor model. They are displayed as 12-
month backward rolling betas. So, if you are in August 2012, this shows the beta for August 
2011 until August 2012. On the right-hand axis we have the market price of the 
OSEFX/MSCI in NOK. 
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Figure 1– Market Price OSEFX/MSCI and four-factor 12-month backward rolling beta 
 
The illustration in figure 3 shows that 12-month backward rolling beta varies more before 
2002 than after. This can be an indication of change in the average fund manager’s strategy. A 
possible explanation can be that in aftermath of the IT-crisis in 2002, fund managers shifted 
their strategy to a less risky position. In the time period from January 2003 to May 2007 the 
OSEFX/MSCI increased steadily, while the betas remained more stable than prior to 2002.  
5.1.4 The null hypothesis H_1 
 
We us the monthly alphas from Carharts four-factor model to investigate if we can reject or 
not the null hypothesis, H_1: Norwegian equity mutual funds do not generate significant 
positive alphas, excluding transaction costs. 
 
Table 3 shows that only 6 per cent of the funds, over the whole time period, generate a 
positive significant alpha, with monthly mean/median of 0.0043. When an investor pays a 
fund manager to invest in the stock market, the least he expects is to get his money’s worth. 
The observation that only 6 per cent of the funds fall into this category, tells us that few 
managers are able to generate abnormal return in the market after controlling for the risk 
factors. 
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Table 3 – Monthly Alphas from Carharts Four-Factor model 
  
 
Jan 1990 - 
Aug 2012 
Jan 1990 - 
Oct 2002 
Oct 2002 - 
Dec 2008 
Jan 2006 - 
Aug 2012 
Dec 2008 - 
Aug 2012 
FU
N
D
 %
 Significant positive 6 % 0 % 13 % 9 % 3 % 
Positive 59 % 40 % 75 % 78 % 50 % 
Negative 35 % 50 % 12 % 13 % 44 % 
Significant negative 0 % 10 % 0 % 0 % 3 % 
M
EA
N
 Significant positive 0.0043 
 
0.0056 0.0040 0.0084 
Positive 0.0014 0.0032 0.0023 0.0015 0.0013 
Negative -0.0008 -0.0016 -0.0007 -0.0014 -0.0018 
Significant negative 
 
-0.0033 
  
-0.0061 
M
ED
IA
N
 Significant positive 0.0043 
 
0.0055 0.0039 0.0084 
Positive 0.0013 0.0020 0.0022 0.0014 0.0010 
Negative -0.0007 -0.0012 -0.0007 -0.0015 -0.0010 
Significant negative 
 
-0.0033 
  
-0.0061 
This table is based on the alphas from Carharts four-factor model (1997) in our five time periods. We have divided the 
alphas based on their significance (90 per cent CI) and if they are positive or negative. Fund % shows how many funds 
there are in each group. We also find the corresponding mean and median alphas for each group. 
The largest group is the one with positive alphas. Over the whole time period 59 per cent of 
the funds end up here, with a mean of 0.0014 and median of 0.0013. They are not significant, 
meaning they are achieving the right return for the level of risk.  
The second largest group is the one with negative alphas, and in the whole time period 35 per 
cent of them end up here, with a mean of -0.0008 and median -0.0007. They are negative and 
non-significant, meaning they do not achieve the right return for the level of risk. 
The last group is the significant negative alphas. We only found this group in the time periods 
1990-2002 and 2008-2012, where 10 and 3 per cent of the funds ended up, respectively. Since 
they are significant negative, this means they do not deliver as much return as needed to cover 
the risk taken. The outlier here was Holberg Norge, with a monthly alpha of -0.00614 from 
December 2008 to August 2012. 
Based on our findings, only 6 per cent of the funds are able to generate a significant positive 
alpha. This suggests that 94 per cent of the funds will not beat the reference index. Because of 
these results, we do not reject the null hypothesis, H_1, hence Norwegian mutual funds do not 
generate significant positive alphas, excluding transaction costs. 
  
35 
 
 
 
5.2 Foreign and Local Investor Behavior 
 
After the first part, where we focused on performance and each funds separately, our datasets 
led us to a more behavioral approach. Investors may find their national stock market to be 
more familiar than foreign stock markets (French and Poterba 1991 among others). 
Explanations to why local overweight their home market are; advantages compared to 
foreigners when it comes to knowledge and available information, and capital immobility. 
Ken French says that, while home bias is still the norm, investors have significantly increased 
their allocation to foreign markets over the last 30 years (Dimensional 2013).  
5.2.1 Adjusted capital asset 
 
Figure 2 shows the constructed market price OSEFX/MSCI in NOK on the right axis. The left 
axis is capital asset in Bill NOK, illustrating the adjusted total capital assets from the 
investors, aggregated. 
 
Figure 2 – Market price and Total Capital Asset Adjusted 
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By eliminating the returns from total capital assets, we are now able to see how the investors 
behave when the market is shifting. The total capital asset adjusted hit a bottom low in June 
2008, with 23 Bill NOK invested in the 32 funds. In December 2009 it increased to 32 Bill 
NOK, representing nearly a 40 per cent increase over the 18 months. 
After looking at the total capital asset adjusted, we want to see if the locals or foreigners are 
the ones contributing to this increase. Figure 3 shows both the foreign and the local capital 
asset, adjusted for only investor flow of capital.  
 
Figure 3 – Total, Foreign and Local Capital Asset Adjusted 
 
Total and local investors are representing the left axis, and the foreigners are presented on the 
right side, all numbers are in Bill NOK. Clearly, we can see that the locals are contributing 
most in terms of amount, because the local axis is ten times bigger than the foreigners. 
Already before the financial crisis reach bottom low in February 2009, we see that both 
groups are starting to invest. From September 2008 to December 2009 the foreigners are 
almost doubling their position approximately from 1.7 Bill NOK to 3.2 Bill NOK, and locals 
increase their capital with 30 per cent from 22 Bill NOK to 29 Bill NOK. Further on, we see 
that the locals do not fluctuate as much as the foreigners. They are decreasing and increasing 
more steadily.   
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5.2.2 Summary of findings 
 
The adjusted capital assets for total, foreigners and locals, indicates that their behavior is 
different; the foreigners are more volatile compared to the locals. It seems that when the 
market is booming, foreigners are chasing performance, by increasing their position more 
compared to the locals.  But in the end, it is still the locals who contribute the most, because 
this group is much larger. 
5.3 Historic Return Predictability of Changes in Capital Assets 
 
We are testing our hypothesis H_2 of relations between historic return and change in capital 
assets. The null hypothesis states that historic returns do not predict larger changes in foreign 
capital assets than locals. In the first part we will analyze total capital assets, before the focus 
shifts towards foreigners and locals where we try to answer the hypothesis and investigate if 
there is any difference. 
In this section, our dependent variables are TOTP, FORP and LOCP. These variables are 
presented horizontally. Our independent variables are historic returns for 1-, 3-, 6- and 12-
month. We are also controlling for size, time effect, previous month return (T1) multiplied 
with size (artificial inflow), flagfund and change in capital assets for last month (TOTPt1, 
FORPt1 and LOCPt1). 
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5.3.1 Total change in capital assets 
 
The results from the regression are presented in table 4. In column 6, we see that 1- and 3-
month historic returns have negative and positive coefficients, respectively. A 0.01 increase in 
historic returns predicts -0.0065 and 0.0165 in TOTP, significant within a 99 per cent 
confidence interval. Historic returns for 6- and 12-month are negative and non- significant. 
This implies that after 1-month of positive return, the TOTP decreases; hence an average 
investor will withdraw money from the funds, which is a surprising result. Further on, over a 
3-month period with positive average return, TOTP increases, hence an average investor will 
invest more money in the funds. An explanation to this might be market timing; investors 
want to capture the upside by investing in mutual funds after three months with continuous 
increase.  
Table 4 – Historic returns predictability of TOTP 
 TOTP TOTP TOTP TOTP TOTP TOTP 
SIZE 
0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Time Effect 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Artificial Inflow 
-0.000 -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TOTPt1 
-0.095 0.003 -0.047 -0.087 -0.080 0.053 
(0.174) (0.166) (0.171) (0.174) (0.167) (0.183) 
FORPt1 
0.005 -0.047 -0.011 0.004 -0.015 -0.045 
(0.043) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041) 
LOCPt1 
0.275 -0.036 0.162 0.267* 0.327** 0.102 
(0.168) (0.157) (0.157) (0.158) (0.162) (0.180) 
Historic 1m Return 
0.012    -0.778*** -0.654*** 
(0.109)    (0.145) (0.144) 
Historic 3m Return 
 1.006***   1.650*** 1.654*** 
 (0.127)   (0.211) (0.208) 
Historic 6m Return 
  0.606***  -0.248 -0.249 
  (0.156)  (0.265) (0.260) 
Historic 12m Return 
   0.189 -0.342 -0.331 
   (0.201) (0.235) (0.232) 
Flagfund 
     0.005*** 
     (0.001) 
Observations 2274 2274 2274 2274 2274 2274 
R2 0.010 0.037 0.017 0.010 0.050 0.077 
In this table we present the coefficients from regression on our dependent variable, total capital asset change (TOTP). Our 
independent variables are historic returns for 1-, 3-, 6- and 12-month. In addition we also control for size, time effect, 
artificial inflow, flagfund and change in capital assets for last month (TOTPt1, FORPt1 and LOCPt1). All control variables 
are described in section 4.3. Significance at a 10, 5 and 1 per cent level is indicated as *, ** and *** respectively. To cope 
with possible heteroscedasticity we use the robust function in STATA.  
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5.3.2 Foreign change in capital assets 
 
Here the dependent variable is FORP. The first four columns in table 5 represent the simplest 
regressions, and we observe that these four coefficients are all positive and significant on a 
high confidence interval, except column 1. In column 5 we merge the four different returns. In 
column 6 we also include our last control variable; flagfund. This column represents our main 
results. Holding all other variables constant, a 0.01 increase in historic 1-, 3- and 6-month 
return predicts -0.00828, 0.01997 and -0.00556 coefficients in FORP. The results are all 
significant within a 99 per cent confidence interval. We find the most extreme case when we 
look at the historic 3-month return. After a 3-month period of positive (negative) return, 
FORP is predicted to increase (decrease) twice the amount of the average return last 3-month.  
 
Table 5 – Historic returns predictability of FORP 
 FORP FORP FORP FORP FORP FORP 
SIZE 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Time Effect 
-0.000* -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Artificial Inflow 
-0.000 -0.000*** -0.000* -0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TOTPt1 
-0.618** -0.512* -0.574** -0.611** -0.603** -0.582** 
(0.284) (0.288) (0.287) (0.284) (0.286) (0.289) 
FORPt1 
0.110** 0.053 0.096** 0.110** 0.087* 0.082* 
(0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.045) 
LOCPt1 
0.837*** 0.510* 0.750*** 0.854*** 0.906*** 0.870*** 
(0.275) (0.275) (0.272) (0.268) (0.279) (0.283) 
Historic 1m Return 
0.070    -0.848*** -0.828*** 
(0.102)    (0.112) (0.112) 
Historic 3m Return 
 1.191***   1.997*** 1.997*** 
 (0.088)   (0.118) (0.118) 
Historic 6m Return 
  0.669***  -0.556*** -0.556*** 
  (0.133)  (0.197) (0.196) 
Historic 12m Return 
   0.350** -0.104 -0.102 
   (0.171) (0.179) (0.178) 
Flagfund 
     0.001* 
     (0.000) 
Observations 2254 2254 2254 2254 2254 2254 
R2 0.039 0.121 0.058 0.042 0.158 0.159 
In this table we present the coefficients from regression on our dependent variable, foreign capital asset change (FORP). Our 
independent variables are historic returns for 1-, 3-, 6- and 12-month. In addition we also control for size, time effect, 
artificial inflow, flagfund and change in capital assets for last month (TOTPt1, FORPt1 and LOCPt1). All control variables 
are described in section 4.3. Significance at a 10, 5 and 1 per cent level is indicated as *, ** and *** respectively. To cope 
with possible heteroscedasticity we use the robust function in STATA. 
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5.3.3 Local change in capital assets 
 
Table 6 represents the last results from the regressions in this section. The structure is the 
same as before, the focus will still be on column 6, where we include all control variables. 
The only difference is that the dependent variable is now LOCP. We observe that in column 1 
the coefficient is negative and not significant. Column 2 and 3 are almost the same as for 
FORP. The coefficient for historic 12-month return is no longer significant.  
When we again include all variables we end up with the most adequate coefficients. The sign 
is still consistent with the previous regression for FORP (see table 5), but with impaired 
magnitude. A 0.01 increase in 1- and 3-month historic return, predicts -0.00683 and 0.01564 
coefficients in LOCP. Both are significant within a 99 per cent confidence interval.  
Table 6 – Historic returns predictability of LOCP 
  LOCP LOCP LOCP LOCP LOCP LOCP 
SIZE 
0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Time Effect 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Artificial Inflow 
0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TOTPt1 
-0.086 0.012 -0.035 -0.075 -0.069 0.029 
(0.158) (0.148) (0.156) (0.161) (0.144) (0.147) 
FORPt1 
0.028 -0.023 0.011 0.026 0.009 -0.013 
(0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.039) (0.039) 
LOCPt1 
0.180 -0.129 0.056 0.161 0.230* 0.067 
(0.152) (0.140) (0.144) (0.146) (0.138) (0.144) 
Historic 1m Return 
-0.009 
   
-0.773*** -0.683*** 
(0.114) 
   
(0.140) (0.137) 
Historic 3m Return 
  0.962*** 
  
1.562*** 1.564*** 
  (0.114) 
  
(0.168) (0.167) 
Historic 6m Return 
  
 
0.602*** 
 
-0.172 -0.172 
  
 
(0.138) 
 
(0.218) (0.215) 
Historic 12m Return 
  
  
0.180 -0.363 -0.356 
      (0.186) (0.223) (0.220) 
Flagfund 
  
    
0.003*** 
          (0.001) 
Observations 2280 2280 2280 2280 2280 2280 
R2 0.006 0.039 0.016 0.007 0.056 0.075 
In this table we present the coefficients from regression on our dependent variable, local capital asset change (LOCP). Our 
independent variables are historic returns for 1-, 3-, 6- and 12-month. In addition we also control for size, time effect, 
artificial inflow, flagfund and change in capital assets for last month (TOTPt1, FORPt1 and LOCPt1). All control variables 
are described in section 4.3 Significance at a 10, 5 and 1 per cent level is indicated as *, ** and *** respectively. To cope 
with possible heteroscedasticity we use the robust function in STATA. 
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5.3.4 Pearson Chi-squared test 
 
In table 5, column 6, we see that the 1-, 3- and 6-month historic return can predict FORP next 
month on a significant level. In table 6, column 6, we see that the 1- and 3-month historic 
return can significantly predict LOCP.  
Even though some of the coefficients are significant by themselves, we need to find out if 
foreigners are significantly different from locals. By using the Pearson Chi-squared we can 
test the difference between the independent variables, FORP and LOCP, and see if they are 
significantly different from zero. 
 
Table 7 – Pearson Chi-Squared test – Historical regressions 
      Column 
      1 2 3 4 5 6 
H
is
to
ri
c 
R
et
ur
ns
 t1 
Chi2 0.33    0.21 0.80 
Prob>Chi2 0.57    0.65 0.37 
t3 
Chi2  3.36   5.30 5.24 
Prob>Chi2  0.07   0.02 0.02 
t6 
Chi2   0.15  1.92 1.91 
Prob>Chi2   0.70  0.17 0.17 
t12 
Chi2    0.55 0.93 0.89 
Prob>Chi2    0.46 0.33 0.35 
In this table we present the results from Pearson Chi-Squared test. Column 1-6 tests if the coefficients FORP and LOCP from 
table 5 and 6 are significant different from zero. If [Prob>Chi2] < 0.10 we reject the hypothesis H_2, while in cases where 
[Prob>Chi2] > 0.10 we do not reject hypothesis H_2. 
 
In the Chi-squared test, column 6, we see that the 1-, 6- and 12-month historic return yield a 
probability above 0.10. We therefore fail to reject the hypothesis H_2; hence we cannot 
distinguish between the estimated coefficients from foreigners and locals. 
In the regression with historic 3-month average, we get a Chi-squared of 5.24 which gives us 
a probability of 0.02. Our Pearson Chi-squared test tells us that we can reject the hypothesis 
H_2; hence that foreigners and local coefficients are different from each other. The FORP 
coefficient estimate is not only positive, it is also significant larger than the LOCP coefficient. 
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5.3.5 Summary of findings 
 
In the regressions for FORP and LOCP we are not able to distinguish between foreigners and 
locals at 1-, 6- and 12-month historic return, even though we find several significant 
coefficients. But for 3-month historic return, our final results states that there is strong 
evidence that historic return predict larger changes in foreign capital assets than locals. This 
implies that foreigners chase performance and are more volatile, compared to locals.  
 
5.4 Change in Capital Assets Predictability of Return 
 
In this section we test our null hypothesis H_3. It states that; changes in foreign capital assets 
do not predict return better than locals. The results are divided into four parts, where the first 
three shows the results from predicting 1-, 3- and 6-month return with changes in capital 
assets. Finally, we evaluate the H_3 using the Pearson Chi-Squared test to see if the difference 
between FORP and LOCP estimated coefficients are significant different from zero. 
Our dependent variables are forward 1-, 3- and 6-month return, and they are presented 
horizontally. The independent variables are total, foreign and local changes in capital assets. 
In addition we also control for size, time effect, historic return and flagfund.  
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5.4.1 Forward 1-month return 
 
In table 8, column 4, we see that the foreigners have a significant positive coefficient against 
forward 1-month return, but the locals do not. This can be explained through information. The 
foreigners clearly have some information, or better information, that makes them able to 
invest in more profitable funds than locals. In the fourth column we see that a 0.01 increase in 
FORP predicts a significant increase of 0.015 next month, holding all other variables constant. 
By following changes in capital assets, we see that the foreign investors are able to transfer 
their information to the market. If the foreigners increase their capital, forward 1-month return 
is expected to be positive. If they decrease their capital, it is expected to be negative. LOCP is 
not able to predict significant 1-month return, and therefore they either do not have the same 
information, or they are not able to generate profit from it. 
 
Table 8 – Forward 1-month return 
                Forward 1-month return 
SIZE 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Time Effect 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Historic 1m Return 
-0.072** -0.075** -0.072** -0.075** 
(0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033) 
Historic 3m Return 
0.623*** 0.605*** 0.625*** 0.602*** 
(0.071) (0.074) (0.071) (0.074) 
Historic 6m Return 
-0.396*** -0.380*** -0.396*** -0.379*** 
(0.056) (0.059) (0.056) (0.059) 
TOTP 
0.005   0.004 
(0.006)   (0.007) 
FORP 
 0.016**  0.015* 
 (0.008)  (0.008) 
LOCP 
  0.004 -0.000 
  (0.007) (0.008) 
Flagfund 
   -0.000 
   (0.000) 
Observations 2473 2258 2479 2252 
R2 0.069 0.070 0.068 0.070 
In this table we present the coefficients from regression on our dependent variable, forward 1-month return. Our independent 
variables are total, foreign and local changes in capital assets (TOTP, FORP and LOCP). In addition we also control for size, 
time effect, historic returns and flagfund. All control variables are described in section 4.3. Significance at a 10, 5 and 1 per 
cent level is indicated as *, ** and *** respectively. To cope with possible heteroscedasticity we use the robust function in 
STATA. 
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5.4.2 Forward 3-month average return 
 
When we investigate the forward 3-month average return in table 9, we observe that both the 
foreigners and the locals have positive significant coefficients. The foreigners continue to 
increase their advantage, but we also see that the locals now have a positive significant 
relation between LOCP and predicted return. Column 4 shows that a 0.01 increase in FORP 
predicts an increase in monthly average return of 0.040 the next three months, while LOCP 
predicts 0.014, holding all other variables constant.  
 
Table 9 – Forward 3-month average return 
 Forward 3-month average return 
SIZE 
-0.000** -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Time Effect 
0.000* 0.000** 0.000* 0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Historic 1m Return 
-0.197*** -0.189*** -0.194*** -0.180*** 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Historic 3m Return 
0.943*** 0.887*** 0.938*** 0.864*** 
(0.042) (0.043) (0.042) (0.043) 
Historic 6m Return 
-0.451*** -0.424*** -0.450*** -0.420*** 
(0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (0.034) 
TOTP 
0.015***   0.003 
(0.004)   (0.004) 
FORP 
 0.042***  0.040*** 
 (0.005)  (0.005) 
LOCP 
  0.019*** 0.014*** 
  (0.005) (0.004) 
Flagfund 
   -0.000 
   (0.000) 
Observations 2446 2229 2449 2226 
R2 0.335 0.348 0.335 0.353 
In this table we present the coefficients from regression on our dependent variable, forward 3-month average return. Our 
independent variables are total, foreign and local changes in capital assets (TOTP, FORP and LOCP). In addition we also 
control for size, time effect, historic returns and flagfund. All control variables are described in section 4.3. Significance at a 
10, 5 and 1 per cent level is indicated as *, ** and *** respectively. To cope with possible heteroscedasticity we use the 
robust function in STATA. 
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5.4.3 Forward 6-month average return 
 
The forward 6-month returns have a positive relation with FORP and LOCP. We observe that 
the coefficients have decreased with 0.006 for both locals and foreigners compared with the 
forward 3-month return. Column 4 shows that a 0.01 increase in FORP predicts an increase in 
monthly average return of 0.034, while LOCP predicts 0.008, holding all other variables 
constant. The reason for the decrease from 3- to 6-month forward can be explained by the 
longer time period. As an example, a change in capital assets in January can better predict 
return in March than in July. 
 
Table 10 – Forward 6-month average return 
 Forward 6-month return 
SIZE 
-0.000*** -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Time Effect 
0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Historic 1m Return 
-0.089*** -0.082*** -0.088*** -0.077*** 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Historic 3m Return 
0.491*** 0.441*** 0.489*** 0.426*** 
(0.032) (0.034) (0.032) (0.035) 
Historic 6m Return 
-0.375*** -0.350*** -0.374*** -0.347*** 
(0.035) (0.037) (0.035) (0.037) 
TOTP 
0.011***   0.002 
(0.003)   (0.003) 
FORP 
 0.035***  0.034*** 
 (0.005)  (0.005) 
LOCP 
  0.013*** 0.008** 
  (0.004) (0.004) 
Flagfund 
   -0.000 
   (0.000) 
Observations 2352 2141 2355 2138 
R2 0.140 0.155 0.139 0.159 
In this table we present the coefficients from regression on our dependent variable, 6-month forward average return. Our 
independent variables are total, foreign and local changes in capital assets (TOTP, FORP and LOCP). In addition we also 
control for size, time effect, historic returns and flagfund. All control variables are described in section 4.3. Significance at a 
10, 5 and 1 per cent level is indicated as *, ** and *** respectively. To cope with possible heteroscedasticity we use the 
robust function in STATA. 
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5.4.4 Pearson Chi-squared test 
 
We find that the FORP can predict 1-, 3- and 6-month return, and LOCP can predict 3- and 6-
month return on a significant level. By using the Pearson Chi-squared test we can evaluate if 
the difference between the coefficients of FORP and LOCP are significantly different from 
zero. This is our results: 
 
Table 11 – Pearson Chi-squared test Forward Regression 
 
  
Forward 1-month 
return 
Forward 3-month 
average return 
Forward 6-month 
average return 
Column 2-3 
Chi2 1.6 11.68 14.93 
Prob>Chi2 0.2056 0.0006 0.0001 
Column 4 
Chi2 1.85 15.19 18.95 
Prob>Chi2 0.1743 0.0001 0.0000 
In this table we present the results from Pearson Chi-Squared test of the results from table 8, 9 and 10. The first row tests if 
the coefficients for locals and foreigners from column 2 and 3 are significant different from zero. The second row tests if the 
difference between the coefficients for locals and foreigners in column 4 are significant different from zero. If [Prob>Chi2] < 
0.10 we reject the hypothesis H_3, while in cases where [Prob>Chi2] > 0.10 we do not reject the hypothesis H_3. 
 
Table 11, Column 2-3 with forward 1-month return, gives us a Chi-squared of 1.85 with a 
probability of 0.1743. Based on a 10 per cent significance level, we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis H_3; hence, LOCP and FORP are not different in predicting 1-month return. 
In the regressions with forward 3- and 6-month return, we get a Chi-squared of 15.19 and 
18.95, respectively. Our Pearson test tells us they are different from each other within a 99.99 
per cent confidence interval, and we can therefore reject our hypothesis H_3. The FORP 
coefficient estimate is not only positive, it is also significant larger than the LOCP coefficient. 
5.4.5 Summary of findings 
In the regression for forward 1-month return we are not able to distinguish between foreigners 
and locals, even though the foreign coefficient is significant and the local is not. One thing we 
can take from this is that foreigners make good use of the available information in a 1-month 
perspective. 
In the regressions of forward 3- and 6-month return there is strong evidence that the change in 
foreign capital assets predicts return better than the change in local capital assets. Not only are 
the coefficients significant positive for foreigners, they are also significant larger than the 
locals. Since we see good performance for foreigners, we can therefore eliminate the irrational 
biases, since this would have led to bad performance.  
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5.5 Risk Strategy Analysis 
 
Finally, we test our null hypothesis H_4 which states: Foreign investors do not outperform 
local investors, controlling for risk. In section 5.4, we observe that the foreigners have 
significant positive coefficient estimates in all three regressions, and with the Chi-squared test 
we find that the difference between FORP and LOCP are significantly different from zero in 
predicting 3- and 6-month return. From this we can say that foreigners predict return better 
than locals, but it do not say anything about the risk they are taking. It could simply be 
because the foreigners have a momentum strategy and the locals do not, or that foreigners 
invest more in growth firms than the locals. It just tells us that foreigners better predict return 
because their risk profile is different from the locals. 
Let us now take risk into account. To measure risk, we can hold a portfolio of funds and 
measure it against the market. In each month we find the 5 funds where the FORP is highest 
and 5 funds where FORP is lowest. After finding the value-weighted average of the HIGH 
and the LOW FORP, we multiply them with their forward 1-month return. By subtracting the 
5 LOW from the 5 HIGH each month, we obtain 78 foreign observations. We did the same for 
locals. After subtracting the 1-month NIBOR from the portfolios, we are now ready to 
compare the foreigners and the locals against the market. We use the four-factor model, and 
this is our results: 
 
Table 12 – Risk strategy with buying 5 HIGH and selling 5 LOW 
 
Foreign                              
5 HIGH - 5 LOW 
Local                              
5 HIGH - 5 LOW 
Beta -0.02285 0.01412 
 
(0.04432) (0.03635) 
SMB -0.11700** -0.02729 
 
(0.05243) (0.05700) 
HML 0.03808 0.00185 
 
(0.04895) (0.05036) 
MOM -0.00428 0.08767** 
 
(0.05122) (0.04347) 
Alpha 0.00398** -0.00091 
 
(0.00190) (0.00187) 
Observations 78 78 
R-squared 0.082 0.058 
In this table we present the coefficients from the regression with the four-factor model on  
the buying 5 HIGH and selling 5 LOW strategy. All variables are described in section 4.3.  
Significance at a 10, 5 and 1 per cent level is indicated as *, ** and *** respectively. To  
cope with possible heteroscedasticity we use the robust function in STATA. 
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Once we take into account the different risk profiles of foreigners and locals, do we still get 
any deviation in terms of performance? We see that the foreign portfolio has a positive 
significant alpha, which tells us that foreigners gain a positive return on top of the risk. The 
locals on the other hand, do not have a positive or significant alpha. When the foreigners are 
investing, adjusting for risk, they give you a positive alpha. This suggests that the foreigners 
have more information than the locals. These results tell us we can reject the null hypothesis, 
H_4; hence foreigners outperform the locals when controlling for risk. Excessive risk taking 
is not the reason for foreigners outperforming the locals, but they have an information 
advantage. 
The approach in table 12 would be difficult to implement, because we cannot short sell a 
funds since we do not know the composition of the portfolio each month. We would also need 
to buy and sell funds every month with this strategy, which would give high transaction costs. 
To cope with this, we do the same regression as before, but now we look on the high and low 
separately. Then we can see if the alpha comes from the buying side or the selling side, see 
table 13: 
 
Table 13 – Risk strategy buying the 5 HIGH and buying the 5 LOW 
 
Foreigners Locals 
 
5 HIGH 5 LOW 5 HIGH 5 LOW 
Beta 0.48006*** 0.50290*** 0.51003*** 0.49607*** 
 
(0.16234) (0.16738) (0.16223) (0.16582) 
SMB 0.31030 0.42730* 0.35772 0.38590 
 
(0.22683) (0.23387) (0.22668) (0.23169) 
HML -0.08392 -0.12199 -0.09798 -0.09946 
 
(0.19618) (0.20227) (0.19605) (0.20038) 
MOM -0.30687* -0.30260 -0.27066 -0.35941* 
  (0.18247) (0.18814) (0.18235) (0.18638) 
Alpha 0.00401 0.00002 0.00038 0.00136 
 
(0.00763) (0.00787) (0.00762) (0.00779) 
Observations 78 78 78 78 
R-squared 0.178 0.170 0.180 0.185 
 In this table we present the coefficients from the regression with the four-factor  
 model when the buying 5 HIGH and buying 5 LOW. All variables are described in  
 section 4.3. Significance at a 10, 5 and 1 per cent level is indicated as *, ** and *** 
 respectively. To cope with possible heteroscedasticity we use the robust function 
 in STATA. 
 
As we can see there is no longer a significant alpha for foreigners, and the locals are still not 
significant. We can therefore not say which side the significant alpha comes from. 
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5.5.1 Summary of findings 
 
In the first strategy, where we buy the 5 HIGH and sell the 5 LOW, foreigners generate a 
statistically significant monthly alpha of 0.00398, while the locals do not. This tells us that 
after controlling for the different risk profiles, the foreigners still outperform the locals, which 
indicate foreign investors have an information advantage.  
In the second strategy, where we buy the 5 HIGH and buy the 5 LOW, we cannot distinguish 
which side the significant alpha comes from. At least we find that the significant alpha do not 
come from the selling side, which would have complicated the approach on different risk 
profiles. 
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6. Results, Discussions and Limitations 
 
6.1 Performance Analysis - Alpha and Backward Rolling Beta 
 
The stock market is often viewed as semi-strong efficient, meaning that stock prices reflect all 
public information, except insider information (Fama 1970). Most studies on this subject find 
that few funds outperform the reference index after accounting for transaction costs. In other 
words, most funds do not generate a positive significant alpha i.e. Carhart (1997). Based on 
this we formulate our first null hypothesis, H_1; Norwegian equity mutual funds do not 
generate significant positive alpha, excluding transaction costs. 
Active portfolio managers believe that the market sometime is mispriced, and they try to earn 
this return through stock picking and timing. The fund performance is measured against a 
reference index, typically an index in the same market segment as the main investments in the 
portfolio. We make use of the four-factor model (Carhart 1997) to evaluate if the funds 
achieve a significant positive alpha. 
Our results show that, in the time period January 1990 to August 2012, most of the 
Norwegian funds do not produce a positive significant alpha. In fact, only 6 per cent of them 
are able to get a significant positive alpha, with a monthly mean and median of 0.0043. Taken 
into account that an investor also need to pay transaction costs, the excess return above the 
market is marginal. We also construct an EW portfolio of the 32 funds, to see how an average 
investor performs. In the time periods 1990-2012 and 1990-2002 we find that the average 
investor receives a significant alpha of -0.00415 and -0.00637. In the time periods 2002-2008, 
2006-2012 and 2008-2012 we also find negative alphas, but no significant results. In the last 
two time periods, we construct a VW portfolio, which did not yield any significant results. 
This suggests that the average investor do not receive a reasonable return on their investment. 
We do not have enough evidence to reject hypothesis H_1, hence Norwegian equity mutual 
funds do not generate significant positive alphas, excluding transaction costs.  
From our equally-weighted portfolio we find the 12-month backward rolling beta with the 
four-factor model and compare it to the market price of OSEFX/MSCI. We find that the betas 
varies more before 2002 than after, which can be a sign of a shift in the average fund manager 
strategy after the IT-crisis. 
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6.2 Foreign and Local Investor Behavior 
 
Our data collected from VFF (2013) gave us an insider view on how the capital asset in funds 
fluctuates, in the time period January 2006 to August 2012. From this we compare our 
aggregated total capital adjusted with the market price of the OSEFX/MSCI. In January 2006 
total capital was 27 Bill NOK, before it steadily decreased to 23 Bill NOK in June 2008 and 
increased to 32 Bill NOK in December 2009. In this time period, the financial crisis was at its 
lowest in February 2009 measured in OSEFX/MSCI NOK. We find that the average investor 
started increasing his investments in June 2008, before the market shifted. Separating the 
foreigners from the locals reveals that, in the 18 months leading up to December 2009, the 
foreigners increased their position with 100 per cent while the locals only increased by 30 per 
cent. Further on, we see that the foreigners are more volatile in changes in capital assets than 
locals. 
6.3 Historic Returns Predictability of Changes in Capital Assets 
 
The foreign and local investor behaviors raise some interesting questions. It seems that 
foreigners are more volatile than locals when it comes to changes in capital assets. Does this 
mean that foreigners value the information and opportunities different than locals, and if so, 
can historic return predict these changes in capital assets? Under the assumption that all 
investors should have the same information, we developed our second null hypothesis, H_2; 
Historic returns do not predict larger changes in foreign capital assets than locals. 
First we evaluate if historic 1-, 3-, 6- and 12-month return can predict total change in capital 
assets. Our findings imply that after 1-month of positive return TOTP5 is predicted to decrease 
with a coefficient of -0.654. Further on, a 3-month period of positive average return predicts 
that TOTP increases with a coefficient of 1.654. Both are significant within a 99 per cent 
confidence interval. We find no significant results that historic 6- or 12- month return predicts 
TOTP. 
After splitting up our investors, in foreigners and locals, we find that a positive historic 1-, 3- 
and 6-month return predicts a coefficient of -0.828, 1.997 and -0.556 in FORP6. An increase 
                                                 
5 (TOTP) Changes in total capital assets 
6 (FORP) Changes in foreign capital assets 
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in historic 1- and 3-month return predicts a coefficient of -0.683 and 1.564 in LOCP7. Both 
the foreigners and local results are significant within a 99 per cent confidence interval. 
We evaluate if the difference between the foreigners and locals is significantly different from 
zero. We find that the 1-, 6- and 12-months historic return coefficients yield a p-value above 
0.10. We therefore do not reject our null hypothesis, H_2; hence we cannot distinguish 
between the foreign and local coefficients. 
In the regression with historic 3-month average, we get a Chi-squared of 5.24 which gives us 
a p-value of 0.02. Our Pearson Chi-squared test tells us that we can reject the hypothesis H_2; 
hence that foreigners and local coefficients are different from each other. This means that in 
addition to be positive significant by themselves, the difference between foreign and local 
coefficients is also significantly different from zero. There is strong evidence that historic 3-
month return predicts larger changes in FORP than in LOCP, which means that the foreigners 
chase performance more than locals. 
6.4 Changes in Capital Assets Predictability of Return 
 
In the previous section we find evidence that foreigners chase performance more than locals. 
This leads us to the following question; do FORP predict return better than LOCP? Since all 
investors should have the same public information, it would be reasonable to assume that 
there is no difference. To evaluate this, we postulate our third null hypothesis, H_3; Changes 
in foreign capital assets do not predict return better than locals. 
First we evaluate if FORP and LOCP can predict 1-month return. Our results show us that 
FORP can significantly predict 1-month return with a coefficient of 0.015. We find no 
significant results for LOCP. 
When we look at the forward 3-month return, we observe that both the FORP and LOCP have 
a monthly positive coefficient of 0.040 and 0.014, significant within a 99 per cent confidence 
interval. As we can see, the foreigners increase their advantage, but LOCP now also predicts 
return. 
The forward 6-month return shows a positive relation between FORP and LOCP in predicting 
return. FORP and LOCP predict 6-month return with estimated coefficients of 0.034 and 
0.008. The FORP (LOCP) is significant within a 99 (95) per cent confidence interval. 
                                                 
7 (LOCP) Changes in local capital assets 
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To investigate if the difference between the coefficients from foreigners and locals are 
different from zero, we again apply the Pearson Chi-squared test.  
The forward 1-month return gives us a Chi-squared of 1.85, which yields a p-value of 0.1743. 
Based on a 10 per cent significance level, we fail to reject the null hypothesis H_3; hence 
LOCP and FORP coefficients are not different from each other. One thing we can take from 
this is that foreigners make good use of the available information in a forward 1-month 
perspective. 
In the regressions with forward 3- and 6-month return, we get a Chi-squared of 15.19 and 
18.95. Our Pearson test tells us they are different from each other within a 99.99 per cent 
confidence interval, and we can therefore reject the null hypothesis. The FORP coefficient 
estimate is not only positive, it is also significant larger than the LOCP coefficient in 
predicting the 3- and 6-month return. This tells us that there is strong evidence that FORP 
predicts good performance better than locals. We can therefore eliminate the irrational biases 
story, since this would have led to bad performance. 
6.5 Risk Strategy Analysis 
 
Our findings in the previous section implies that changes in foreign capital assets predicts 3- 
and 6-month return better than changes in local capital assets. From this we can say that 
foreigners predicts good performance better than locals, but it do not say anything about the 
risk they are taking. Once you take into account the different risk profiles, do we still get any 
differences in terms of performance? From this we developed our final null hypothesis, H_4, 
which states that foreign investors do not outperform local investors, controlling for risk. To 
measure this we did a risk strategy analysis, to see if the difference is due to asymmetric 
information or simply excessive risk taking. After controlling for risk, we see that the foreign 
portfolio has a statistically significant monthly alpha of 0.00398, while the locals do not. 
When the foreigners are investing, adjusting for risk, they give you a positive alpha. This 
suggests that it is not excessive risk taking that gives foreigners an advantage, it is 
information. We can therefore reject the null hypothesis H_4; hence foreigners outperform 
locals when controlling for different risk profiles. 
The approach above is difficult to implement, since we are buying and shorting mutual funds. 
We cannot short sell a mutual fund. To cope with this, we do a regression of holding the 
buying and the selling funds separate, to see which side generates the positive alpha. We were 
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not able to find out which side the significant alpha came from. On the other hand, it 
strengthens our results that the 5 selling funds do not generate a significant alpha. 
 
6.6 Robustness Testing 
 
As a robustness test we also use OSEFX as reference index, and include the remaining 34 
Norwegian equity mutual funds that didn’t fulfill our restrictions in section 4.4.1.  For all the 
five time periods, we now observe significant alphas more frequently, and they were generally 
more negative and less positive. Since an investor can invest 20 per cent abroad, one would 
think that compared to the OSEFX, the investor will gain a higher alpha because of the 
diversification effect. On the other hand, the differences are rather small. 
Out of the 74 Norwegian funds, there were eight index funds. These funds have alphas 
approximately equal to zero, and almost none of them are significant as expected since they 
are tracking the index. 
As a robustness test we also calculate the correlation between our alternative indices and 
EW32, the results was as expected, values close to 1. E.g. the MSCI index from 
Børsprosjektet and the one from MSCI (2013) have correlation on 0.93. 
In the historic and forward regressions in part two we play around with winsorizing, and 
without this adjustment we rarely observe significant coefficients for the independent 
variables. In addition the R2 were approximately zero. We find that a limit of 1 per cent gave 
acceptable results even though it appears extreme outliers’ in changes in capital assets. The 
difference between 1 and 2.5 per cent winsorizing was minimal. 
In section 5.5 we hold an investment strategy with long (short) positions in the 5 funds with 
highest (lowest) change in capital assets. We investigate if we get consistent results 
implementing 3 HIGH – 3 LOW and 10 HIGH – 10 LOW strategies, but we observe no 
significant alphas. This means that we cannot conclude that investors generate significant 
positive alphas from these strategies. 
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6.7 Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research 
 
We do not include transaction costs, since it proved difficult to find accurate and reliable data. 
If transaction costs are included, the performance part of the funds can be more nuanced. 
Even if a fund produces a positive significant alpha, the excess return can be zero or even 
negative after including the additional costs of trading. 
In the time period 2006 to 2012, when we look on investor behavior, we restrict that each 
fund must have 12 monthly observations, and at least 50 total investors. This is a limitation, 
and to expand the data material you can include all funds and do the same analysis for the 
Nordic countries, Europe etc. 
Our regressions in the part with foreign and local changes in capital assets do not distinguish 
between private and institutional investors. To get a more accurate basis for comparison 
between foreigners and locals, the data can be split between these two investor types and 
compare local institutional investors with foreign institutional investors. 
When evaluating if the foreigners and locals gain a positive significant alpha when accounting 
for market risk in section 5.5, we only found this for the 5 HIGH – 5 LOW portfolios. We 
also tried with 3 HIGH – 3 LOW and 10 HIGH – 10 LOW, which did not yield any 
significant results for alpha. We only did the risk strategy with forward 1-month return. A risk 
strategy that looks on 3- and 6-month average return can be implemented, but then you need 
to revise the control variables. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
This paper investigates how Norwegian equity mutual funds performed in the time period 
1990 to 2012, with the main focus on the time period 2006 to 2012, where we try to reveal 
differences between foreign and local investor behavior. 
By using the four-factor model from Carhart (1997), we find that in the time period January 
1990 to August 2012, only 6 per cent of the funds are able to generate a significant positive 
alpha with an annual mean of 5.16 per cent. Our equally-weighted portfolio, consisting of the 
32 funds in our research, reveals that an average investor receives a significant annual alpha 
of – 4.92 and – 7.64 per cent in the time period 1990 – 2012 and 1990 – 2002. This tells us 
that Norwegian mutual funds are not expected to generate a positive significant alpha, 
excluding transaction costs.  
The adjusted capital assets, constructed from the data from VFF (2013), suggest that 
foreigners are more volatile when it comes to changes in capital assets than locals, hence 
foreigners invests differently than locals. Further, we want to investigate if foreigners 
outperform locals and see if any differences can be explained by irrational biases, different 
risk profiles or information advantages.  
When evaluating if historical returns can predict changes in capital assets, we find strong 
evidence that historic 3-month return predicts larger changes in foreign capital assets than 
locals, which tells us that foreigners chase performance more than locals.  
Next, we find strong evidence that change in foreign capital assets predicts 3- and 6-month 
return better than the change in local capital assets. This means that foreigners have an 
advantage over the locals, and it is not due to irrational biases, since this would have given 
bad performance.  
Finally, controlling for different risk profiles, we find that foreigners generates a positive 
significant alpha, while locals do not. This emphasize that excessive risk taking is not the 
reason why foreigners outperform the locals and suggests that foreign investors have an 
information advantage. 
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Appendix 
 
A 1 – Model: OSEFX/MSCI – Four-factor model – BETA 
 Fund name 
Jan 1990            
-             
Aug 2012    
Jan 1990      
-               
Oct 2002 
Oct 2002      
-              
Dec 2008 
Jan 2006      
-              
Aug 2012 
Dec 2008     
-              
Aug 2012 
AFB Aktiv 1.29378*** 1.37501*** 1.15862*** 1.18371*** 1.23092*** 
AFB Kapital 1.22296*** 1.18542*** 1.16744*** 1.18180*** 1.22468*** 
AFB Norge 1.20128*** 1.20959*** 1.13189*** 1.15998*** 1.16225*** 
AFB Norge Pluss 1.16886*** 1.15929*** 1.12950*** 1.15913*** 1.16412*** 
Carnegie Aksje Norge 1.12695*** 1.04701*** 1.12336*** 1.12438*** 1.16009*** 
Delphi Norge 1.11938*** 1.16460*** 1.01199*** 1.06847*** 1.13918*** 
Delphi Vekst 1.12146*** 1.18070*** 1.00456*** 1.05828*** 1.13589*** 
DF Norge 1 1.20247*** 1.28030*** 1.05411*** 1.06065*** 1.06733*** 
DF Norge 2 1.13088*** 1.08884*** 1.10650*** 1.12824*** 1.15429*** 
DF Norge Vekst 1.12781*** 1.07272*** 1.11435*** 1.13134*** 1.15750*** 
DNB 1 1.10717*** 1.10039*** 1.06149*** 1.07005*** 1.08471*** 
DNB 3 1.09520*** 1.11254*** 1.06081*** 1.07066*** 1.08435*** 
DNB Avanse 1 1.15347*** 1.19050*** 1.10668*** 1.07641*** 1.13734*** 
DNB Avanse 2 1.17939*** 1.11306*** 1.16168*** 1.25039*** 1.25517*** 
DNB Selektiv 1 1.11480*** 1.07997*** 1.04912*** 1.04117*** 1.17117*** 
Handelsbanken Norge 1.12421*** 1.05891*** 1.10391*** 1.15885*** 1.20243*** 
Holberg Norge 1.11813*** 1.07662*** 1.12664*** 1.12877*** 1.16054*** 
NB-Aksjefond 1.14506*** 1.14034*** 1.10846*** 1.11123*** 1.14395*** 
Nordea Avkastning 1.21601*** 1.13334*** 1.20270*** 1.11568*** 1.14555*** 
Nordea Kapital 1.13672*** 1.11096*** 1.12767*** 1.11945*** 1.14119*** 
Nordea SMB 1.14802*** 1.18891*** 1.11951*** 0.98574*** 1.04027*** 
Nordea Vekst 1.21542*** 1.20356*** 1.16966*** 1.13442*** 1.19300*** 
ODIN Norge 1.03036*** 1.34009*** 1.01861*** 1.03948*** 1.06235*** 
Orkla Finans Fund 1.03082*** 
 
1.02969*** 1.03082*** 1.05675*** 
Pareto Aksje Norge 1.32406*** 1.40728*** 1.21392*** 1.13301*** 1.21560*** 
Pareto Verdi 1.23014*** 1.29488*** 1.15520*** 1.05167*** 1.10608*** 
Storebrand Aksje Innland 1.09720*** 1.13621*** 1.05911*** 1.05548*** 1.05143*** 
Storebrand Norge 1.17198*** 1.15798*** 1.13267*** 1.14890*** 1.17171*** 
Storebrand Vekst 1.22797*** 1.27677*** 1.12168*** 1.12486*** 1.17939*** 
Storebrand Verdi 1.02983*** 1.09134*** 0.99578*** 1.01881*** 0.99912*** 
Terra Norge 1.17299*** 1.08855*** 1.07435*** 1.18275*** 1.22736*** 
WW Norge Verdi 1.17247***   1.11936*** 1.15385*** 1.20960*** 
Equally Weighted portfolio 1.17437*** 1.18413*** 1.14135*** 1.11962*** 1.11790*** 
Value Weighted portfolio 
   
1.08069*** 1.11390*** 
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A 2 – Model: OSEFX/MSCI – Four-factor model – SMB 
 
 Fund name 
Jan 1990            
-              
Aug 2012    
Jan 1990      
-               
Oct 2002 
Oct 2002      
-              
Dec 2008 
Jan 2006      
-              
Aug 2012 
Dec 2008     
-              
Aug 2012 
AFB Aktiv 0.23225*** 0.52136*** -0.01926 0.11384** 0.05671 
AFB Kapital 0.23260*** 0.61282*** 0.00873 0.10903** 0.04904 
AFB Norge -0.00889 0.03050 -0.13320** 0.08075** 0.04391 
AFB Norge Pluss -0.00972 0.11833* -0.13469** 0.07963** 0.04698 
Carnegie Aksje Norge -0.04702 0.01055 -0.14575** 0.10058*** 0.06873 
Delphi Norge 0.25403*** 0.32553*** 0.11020 0.04971 0.07215 
Delphi Vekst 0.24711*** 0.28981** 0.12387 0.01165 0.06028 
DF Norge 1 -0.03197 0.06930 -0.19188*** 0.02010 0.02933 
DF Norge 2 -0.03566 0.06247 -0.19603*** 0.01904 0.02894 
DF Norge Vekst 0.34952*** 0.59630*** 0.09641 0.00030 0.00895 
DNB 1 -0.05410** -0.00874 -0.18875*** 0.12500*** 0.07099 
DNB 3 -0.08577*** 0.01969 -0.19278*** 0.12434*** 0.06991 
DNB Avanse 1 -0.03040 0.03759 -0.17966*** 0.02242 0.00158 
DNB Avanse 2 -0.02984 0.04598 -0.16782*** 0.02224 0.00107 
DNB Selektiv 1 -0.01546 0.15672* -0.14976** 0.11280*** 0.06781 
Handelsbanken Norge -0.00668 0.07311 -0.16040*** -0.02031 -0.11938* 
Holberg Norge 0.11274* 0.11017 0.04973 -0.05491 -0.10211 
NB-Aksjefond 0.03437 0.01664 -0.00613 -0.05873 -0.08897 
Nordea Avkastning -0.05550** -0.03266 -0.11058** 0.03298 0.01923 
Nordea Kapital -0.01101 0.11125 -0.12684** 0.02782 0.01338 
Nordea SMB 0.36049*** 0.48371*** 0.22683** -0.09998 -0.17814 
Nordea Vekst -0.03367 -0.00452 -0.09198 0.02867 0.02571 
ODIN Norge 0.21954*** 0.23258*** 0.21976** -0.09301 -0.09658 
Orkla Finans Fund 0.03664 0.10092** -0.09421 -0.00190 0.00739 
Pareto Aksje Norge 0.03640 0.23423 0.02709 -0.04775 -0.03902 
Pareto Verdi 0.12265* 
 
0.21838 -0.04872 -0.03804 
Storebrand Aksje Innland -0.09038*** 0.02718 -0.19556*** 0.11441*** 0.08147* 
Storebrand Norge -0.01236 0.03303 -0.12917** 0.04405 0.05180 
Storebrand Vekst 0.24767*** 0.34332*** 0.02547 -0.12418 -0.15324 
Storebrand Verdi -0.16064*** 0.00296 -0.27214*** 0.16069*** 0.07712 
Terra Norge 0.04775 0.15130* -0.20133*** 0.02205 -0.10175 
WW Norge Verdi 0.07510 
 
0.02852 -0.08381* -0.10962* 
Equally Weighted portfolio 0.05288** 0.09427*** -0.04200 -0.00793 -0.01120 
Value Weighted portfolio   
  
0.00246 0.00753 
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A 3 – Model: OSEFX/MSCI – Four-factor model – HML 
 
 Fund name 
Jan 1990            
-             
Aug 2012    
Jan 1990      
-               
Oct 2002 
Oct 2002      
-              
Dec 2008 
Jan 2006      
-              
Aug 2012 
Dec 2008     
-              
Aug 2012 
AFB Aktiv -0.09017* -0.06194 -0.06636 -0.01939 0.01195 
AFB Kapital -0.04076 -0.02572 -0.01250 -0.00620 0.03097 
AFB Norge 0.01746 0.04359 -0.11779** 0.00978 0.03543 
AFB Norge Pluss -0.01876 0.02825 -0.11833** 0.00663 0.02830 
Carnegie Aksje Norge -0.12790*** -0.19439*** -0.08622 -0.03837 -0.02563 
Delphi Norge -0.14355*** -0.23780*** 0.00420 0.06611 0.03114 
Delphi Vekst -0.18435*** -0.36457*** -0.02694 0.09199 0.07672 
DF Norge 1 -0.00366 0.03180 -0.05631 0.02907 -0.01320 
DF Norge 2 -0.00134 0.03805 -0.05466 0.02902 -0.01573 
DF Norge Vekst -0.15563** -0.24786** 0.10277 0.02189 0.02033 
DNB 1 -0.03338* -0.01374 -0.12173** -0.02732 -0.02748 
DNB 3 -0.03921 0.01485 -0.12559** -0.02777 -0.02732 
DNB Avanse 1 -0.00271 0.01794 -0.05722 0.01259 0.00644 
DNB Avanse 2 -0.00261 0.01763 -0.04509 0.01241 0.00660 
DNB Selektiv 1 -0.02009 0.04490 -0.06873 -0.02321 -0.03364 
Handelsbanken Norge -0.02245 -0.00127 -0.11814** -0.02563 0.03486 
Holberg Norge 0.04406 -0.14941 0.03340 0.15490** 0.17993*** 
NB-Aksjefond 0.06591** 0.01393 -0.01692 0.19848*** 0.22977*** 
Nordea Avkastning -0.00680 0.01343 -0.08703* 0.02019 0.01704 
Nordea Kapital -0.02839 0.00533 -0.08706* 0.01298 0.00830 
Nordea SMB 0.10830* -0.01192 0.18532** 0.25403*** 0.29776** 
Nordea Vekst -0.01304 0.00053 -0.09793 0.03566 0.04261 
ODIN Norge 0.16046*** 0.12337** 0.23519*** 0.14381* 0.18330** 
Orkla Finans Fund 0.00897 0.02432 -0.05401 0.03714 0.04765 
Pareto Aksje Norge 0.15424*** 0.37417 0.12224 0.09779 0.14966** 
Pareto Verdi 0.09741 
 
-0.06604 0.09741 0.14854** 
Storebrand Aksje Innland -0.05740** -0.00076 -0.12255** -0.05544 -0.04482 
Storebrand Norge -0.00601 0.00940 -0.07933 0.01405 0.01281 
Storebrand Vekst -0.29719*** -0.39294*** -0.09561 0.02544 0.05933 
Storebrand Verdi 0.03728 0.18690** -0.09796 -0.04885 -0.01345 
Terra Norge -0.09751** -0.24681*** -0.12349** 0.12972** 0.21351*** 
WW Norge Verdi 0.12503***   0.01614 0.18493*** 0.21611*** 
Equally Weighted portfolio -0.02847 -0.03577 -0.03807 0.04509 0.03840 
Value Weighted portfolio       0.05055 0.07175 
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A 4 – Model: OSEFX/MSCI – Four-factor model – MOM 
 
 Fund name 
Jan 1990            
-             
Aug 2012    
Jan 1990      
-               
Oct 2002 
Oct 2002      
-              
Dec 2008 
Jan 2006      
-              
Aug 2012 
Dec 2008     
-              
Aug 2012 
AFB Aktiv 0.10959*** 0.07227 0.10983* 0.11384** 0.05671 
AFB Kapital 0.07784* -0.03695 0.09228 0.10903** 0.04904 
AFB Norge 0.05855*** 0.04420 0.08035** 0.08075** 0.04391 
AFB Norge Pluss 0.05145** -0.00536 0.07390** 0.07963** 0.04698 
Carnegie Aksje Norge 0.11723*** 0.10119* 0.10132** 0.10058*** 0.06873 
Delphi Norge 0.05312 0.09084 -0.06895 0.04971 0.07215 
Delphi Vekst 0.05656 0.15000 -0.07601 0.01165 0.06028 
DF Norge 1 -0.03932 -0.10175* -0.01050 0.02010 0.02933 
DF Norge 2 -0.03972 -0.09802* -0.01301 0.01904 0.02894 
DF Norge Vekst 0.14751*** 0.18347* 0.11678** 0.00030 0.00895 
DNB 1 0.04790** 0.01872 0.07138* 0.12500*** 0.07099 
DNB 3 0.02850 -0.05362 0.07258** 0.12434*** 0.06991 
DNB Avanse 1 0.00023 -0.03257 0.01699 0.02242 0.00158 
DNB Avanse 2 0.01924 -0.01163 0.04112 0.02224 0.00107 
DNB Selektiv 1 -0.03591 -0.18143*** 0.01874 0.11280*** 0.06781 
Handelsbanken Norge 0.03946 0.03412 0.07429** -0.02031 -0.11938* 
Holberg Norge -0.01938 -0.02790 0.04451 -0.05491 -0.10211 
NB-Aksjefond -0.05188* -0.07685* -0.02920 -0.05873 -0.08897 
Nordea Avkastning 0.00584 -0.00476 -0.01297 0.03298 0.01923 
Nordea Kapital 0.02026 0.00708 -0.00834 0.02782 0.01338 
Nordea SMB 0.00496 -0.08782 0.09427 -0.09998 -0.17814 
Nordea Vekst 0.00270 -0.00915 -0.01802 0.02867 0.02571 
ODIN Norge -0.03126 -0.08129 0.08370 -0.09301 -0.09658 
Orkla Finans Fund 0.03569 0.02725 0.03206 -0.00190 0.00739 
Pareto Aksje Norge 0.10305** 0.20170 0.17963*** -0.04775 -0.03902 
Pareto Verdi -0.04872 
 
-0.10103 -0.04872 -0.03804 
Storebrand Aksje Innland 0.04792* -0.02090 0.07294** 0.11441*** 0.08147* 
Storebrand Norge 0.02415 0.00427 0.01697 0.04405 0.05180 
Storebrand Vekst 0.06548 0.18906** -0.09413 -0.12418 -0.15324 
Storebrand Verdi 0.10040*** -0.04291 0.23550*** 0.16069*** 0.07712 
Terra Norge 0.02482 -0.01605 0.06434 0.02205 -0.10175 
WW Norge Verdi -0.02815 
 
0.01063 -0.08381* -0.10962* 
Equally Weighted portfolio 0.04908** 0.04566 0.02349 0.02220 0.01567 
Value Weighted portfolio 
   
0.01205 -0.01062 
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A 5 – Transaction costs per month  
 
Fund name 
Average total cost 
per month 
Minimum 
buy (NOK) 
AFB Aktiv 0.00127 25 000 
AFB Kapital - - 
AFB Norge 0.00101 25 000 
AFB Norge Pluss 0.00058 10 000 000 
Carnegie Aksje Norge 0.00100 1 000 
Delphi Norge 0.00167 1 000 
Delphi Vekst 0.00103 1 000 
DF Norge 1 0.00167 1 000 
DF Norge 2 0.00104 50 000 
DF Norge Vekst 0.00146 1 000 
DNB 1 0.00150 1 000 
DNB 3 0.00084 2 500 000 
DNB Avanse 1 0.00151 1 000 
DNB Avanse 2 0.00100 1 000 000 
DNB Selektiv 1 0.00168 1 000 
Handelsbanken Norge 0.00167 1 000 
Holberg Norge 0.00125 3 000 
NB-Aksjefond 0.00189 1 000 
Nordea Avkastning 0.00167 100 
Nordea Kapital 0.00083 1 000 000 
Nordea SMB 0.00167 100 
Nordea Vekst 0.00167 100 
ODIN Norge 0.00167 3 000 
Orkla Finans Fund - - 
Pareto Aksje Norge 0.00042 100 000 000 
Pareto Verdi 0.00168 200 000 
Storebrand Aksje Innland 0.00050 10 000 000 
Storebrand Norge 0.00125 100 
Storebrand Vekst 0.00167 100 
Storebrand Verdi 0.00167 100 
Terra Norge 0.00183 300 
WW Norge Verdi 0.00189 300 
   (Morningstar 2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
